Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Weak MD5 Request Signing (CWE-327) in Setracker2 App

CVE-2026-9221

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cryptographic Weakness

CWE:

CWE-327

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Session Hijacking

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Setracker2 Android Companion App relies on MD5-based request signatures to authenticate API communications, exposing users to session hijacking risk.

Because MD5 is cryptographically broken, attackers may derive the session ID from observed signatures and then impersonate legitimate users over the backend REST API.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in the API authentication layer of the Setracker2 Android Companion App when mobile clients communicate with the backend REST API.

The app signs requests using MD5 over session-related data, and the backend accepts these signatures as proof of authenticity.

In environments where network traffic can be intercepted or application behavior can be inspected, the weakness in MD5 undermines the integrity and secrecy of the session identifier.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network communication between the Android client and the Setracker2 backend REST API.
  • Required access: Ability to observe or capture request signatures and related parameters (e.g., via network sniffing, proxying, or app instrumentation).
  • Trigger point: Any authenticated API request that includes the MD5-derived signature tied to the session context.
  • Why exploitation is possible: MD5 is a broken cryptographic hash function with properties that can allow attackers to reverse or otherwise derive sensitive session information from the signature, breaking the intended integrity and confidentiality guarantees.

Why this happens

The core issue is the continued use of MD5 for generating request signatures that protect session identifiers and authenticate API calls.

MD5, mapped to CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, is vulnerable to collisions and other cryptanalytic attacks and is unsuitable for modern authentication or integrity mechanisms.

By treating an MD5 hash as a strong, one-way signature, the system places trust in an algorithm that no longer provides the necessary resistance to analysis and manipulation, allowing attackers to infer or reconstruct session data.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could recover or infer valid session IDs from observed request signatures.
  • Malicious actors may impersonate legitimate users and issue authenticated API requests.
  • Unauthorized access to user-specific data and device-related information could occur.
  • Actions such as configuration changes or tracking-related operations might be performed on behalf of the victim.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on replacing broken cryptographic primitives and redesigning the authentication scheme to avoid exposing session identifiers through weak signatures.

Common patterns include:

  • Using modern, vetted cryptographic algorithms (e.g., HMAC with SHA-256) for request signing.
  • Ensuring that session IDs are never derivable from signatures and are transmitted only over secure channels.
  • Adopting token-based authentication mechanisms with strong randomness and limited lifetime.
  • Applying the principle of least privilege to API operations, minimizing what a single session can perform.
  • Designing the protocol so that compromise of a single request signature does not reveal long-lived credentials or global secrets.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves analyzing cryptographic usage in both client and server code to identify broken or risky algorithms.

High-level approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag MD5 and other deprecated hash functions used for authentication, integrity, or key derivation.
  • Code review practices focused on API authentication flows, checking whether request signatures are based on modern HMAC constructions and non-reversible data.
  • Architectural reviews that map how session IDs are generated, stored, and transmitted, looking for signs they can be derived from observable values.
  • Security policy enforcement in CI pipelines that prohibit the use of known-weak algorithms for new or existing functionality.

Sources

SourceLink
raw.githubusercontent.comraw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/refs/heads/develop/csaf_files/VA/white/2026/va-26-176-01.json

Frequently asked

questions

No. Any attacker who can observe, intercept, or otherwise capture request signatures and related traffic between the app and backend may attempt to exploit this weakness, including on-path network attackers.

An attacker needs visibility into the authenticated API traffic or the ability to instrument the app to observe how signatures are generated. This can be achieved through network interception on unsecured or poorly protected connections.

Replace MD5-based request signatures with a modern, standardized authentication scheme such as HMAC with SHA-256 over non-reversible data, ensure strong randomness for session tokens, and avoid deriving session IDs from any value exposed in signatures.

Establish cryptography standards that disallow deprecated algorithms, perform regular security reviews of authentication and signing mechanisms, use well-maintained libraries, and integrate automated checks in the development pipeline to flag risky cryptographic use.

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