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CVE-2025-69929

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Cryptographic Weakness in N3uron Web UI

CVE-2025-69929

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cryptographic Weakness

CWE:

CWE-327

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

N3uron Web User Interface 1.21.7-240207.1047 performs password hashing on the client side using MD5 over a predictable string format, exposing derived credentials to cryptographic attacks.

A remote attacker who can observe or capture this predictable hash value may be able to recover or bypass user passwords and escalate privileges within the web interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the authentication flow of the N3uron Web User Interface when passwords are transformed in the browser using MD5 before being sent to the server.

It is relevant in deployments where:

  • Client-side hashing results are treated as the primary credential,
  • The MD5 hash format is predictable and repeatable for a given user/password pair,
  • Network adversaries or other observers can capture or derive the hashed value.

Under these conditions, the hash effectively operates as a static password surrogate that can be replayed or brute-forced.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing or internally reachable N3uron Web UI login endpoint.
  • Required access: Ability to interact with the login interface and/or capture traffic or stored hashes (e.g., via network sniffing, logs, database compromise, or browser debugging tools).
  • Trigger point: Submission of authentication requests where the client generates an MD5 hash of a predictable string derived from the password.
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • MD5 is a cryptographically broken algorithm that is fast and amenable to brute force and rainbow table attacks.
  • The string format hashed on the client is predictable, meaning the same input always yields the same hash with no significant entropy beyond the password itself.
  • If the server treats the MD5 output as the credential, an attacker only needs the hash value (not the original password) to authenticate or escalate privileges.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the reliance on a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) and its use on the client side as a security control for password handling.

Instead of using a slow, salted, and server-side password hashing scheme, the application computes a fast MD5 hash in the browser over a deterministic input.

This creates a situation where:

  • The hash functions as a reusable token.
  • Attackers can brute force or replay the hash without needing the original password.

This maps to CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, as it trusts an obsolete hashing algorithm in a context where resistance to guessing and replay is critical.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers may authenticate as other users by replaying captured MD5 hashes.
  • Privilege escalation to administrative accounts if hashes for high-privilege users are obtained.
  • Compromise of configuration data, operational settings, or connected systems managed through the N3uron UI.
  • Facilitation of broader lateral movement if the same or similar credentials are reused in other systems.
  • Undermining of audit trails and accountability due to unauthorized access under legitimate user identities.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing client-side reliance on broken cryptographic hashes and enforcing robust server-side credential handling.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Treating the user password as a secret handled over a secure transport channel (e.g., TLS) and performing all password verification on the server.
  • Using established password hashing schemes on the server such as Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 with per-user salts and appropriate work factors.
  • Avoiding the use of MD5 (or similarly weak algorithms like SHA-1) for any security-sensitive hashing operation.
  • Ensuring that any client-side transformations are non-security-critical (e.g., for UX) and do not become standalone authentication tokens.
  • Applying least privilege and strong role separation so that compromise of one account has limited impact.

These patterns help ensure that even if network traffic or stored values are exposed, practical exploitation remains significantly more difficult.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for this vulnerability class using:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flagging use of MD5, SHA-1, or other known-weak cryptographic primitives in front-end JavaScript or back-end code.
  • Reviewing authentication flows to confirm that password verification is handled exclusively server-side with a hardened password hashing scheme.
  • Security architecture reviews:
  • Diagramming authentication and session flows to identify where credentials or credential-equivalent tokens are generated and stored.
  • Verifying that no client-side-derived hash or token is accepted as a long-lived credential.
  • Automated policy enforcement:
  • Applying secure coding policies that prohibit weak algorithms and require approved cryptographic libraries.
  • Integrating linters or SAST tools into CI pipelines to block merges that introduce disallowed algorithms or patterns.
  • Operational monitoring:
  • Watching for anomalous login activity patterns characteristic of credential stuffing or replay attacks.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/JoseAbreu28/67f5d8bfc7ba1def526efeda5771a244
n3uron.comn3uron.com/addressing-cve-2025-69929-in-n3uron-web-user-interface/
linkedin.comlinkedin.com/in/joselabreu

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Because the weakness lies in how the client-side hash and authentication are designed, a remote attacker who can interact with the login interface or capture the hash over the network may leverage it without local system access.

The attacker typically requires the ability to capture or derive the MD5 hash value used as the credential surrogate, which can come from observing network traffic, accessing application logs or databases, or inspecting the browser's behavior. Public availability of the web interface increases the risk surface.

Move all password verification logic to the server and use a modern, slow, salted password hashing algorithm. Eliminate MD5 from the authentication path, ensure the application uses TLS for transport, and treat any client-side transformations as non-security-critical.

Establish cryptographic design guidelines that:

  • Disallow broken algorithms such as MD5 and SHA-1.
  • Require server-side password hashing with approved algorithms.
  • Mandate security architecture review for authentication and session management changes.

Enforce these guidelines through code review, automated static analysis, and security-focused testing of authentication flows.

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