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CVE-2026-36609

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Predictable Cryptography and Static Nonce (CWE-327) in Mercusys AC12G Router Authentication

CVE-2026-36609

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cryptographic Weakness

CWE:

CWE-327, CWE-341

Impact:

Authentication Credential Recovery and Administrative Account Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 routers with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 use a static, per-source-IP authentication nonce combined with a predictable XOR-based encoding scheme for passwords.

An attacker who captures authentication tokens can leverage the static nonce and weak encoding to reverse the process and recover the plaintext admin password, enabling full control of the router's management interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web-based management authentication process of the Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 router running firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909.

The router issues an authentication nonce that is static per source IP and then applies a predictable XOR-based transformation (via the securityEncode function) to encode the password in transit.

In environments where attackers can observe or intercept management traffic—such as shared networks, exposed WAN management interfaces, or local network access points—the encoded tokens can be captured and systematically reversed.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Router web administration interface (typically HTTP/HTTPS on the LAN, and potentially WAN if remote management is enabled).
  • Required access: Ability to observe or intercept authentication traffic, e.g., via local network access, ARP spoofing, compromised AP, or misconfigured remote management.
  • Trigger point: An administrator performs a login to the router's web interface while the attacker is able to capture the encoded authentication token.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The nonce used in the authentication scheme does not change between requests from the same source IP, and the XOR-based password encoding is predictable and reversible. As a result, a captured token combined with knowledge of the static nonce and algorithm is sufficient to derive the original plaintext password.

Why this happens

The core issue is the use of cryptographically weak and predictable mechanisms to protect authentication credentials.

Instead of using a proven, one-way cryptographic primitive or a standard transport-layer protection model, the router employs a deterministic XOR-based transformation that acts as simple obfuscation rather than true encryption.

This is compounded by a static nonce that does not change across requests from the same source IP, violating best practices for nonces and session freshness.

Together, these patterns map to:

  • CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, because the XOR-based scheme does not provide adequate confidentiality.
  • CWE-341: Predictable Cryptographic Algorithm, because the nonce and transformation are predictable enough to allow straightforward reversal of the encoded password.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could recover the plaintext administrator password from captured authentication exchanges.
  • Compromise of the router's administrative interface, allowing full configuration changes.
  • Modification of DNS settings to redirect user traffic (phishing, malware distribution, or surveillance).
  • Installation or activation of malicious features (e.g., traffic mirroring, port forwarding rules) to enable further attacks inside the local network.
  • Loss of integrity and confidentiality for network traffic passing through the compromised router.

General mitigation guidance

Defensive strategies should focus on strengthening credential handling and reducing exposure of the management interface:

  • Replace proprietary XOR-based encoding with standard, vetted cryptographic protocols that provide confidentiality and integrity, such as TLS for transport and secure password handling server-side.
  • Use nonces that are unique per authentication attempt and per session, and ensure they cannot be predicted or reused.
  • Avoid designing schemes where the client can deterministically reconstruct secrets or where encoded credentials can be trivially reversed.
  • Limit exposure of the management interface to trusted networks only (e.g., disable WAN access, restrict to management VLANs) and use least-privilege accounts where possible.
  • Encourage the use of strong, unique administrative passwords to reduce the impact of potential credential disclosure.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection and assessment can focus on configuration, traffic patterns, and code-level review:

  • Static analysis / code review: Search firmware or web interface code for custom cryptographic implementations, XOR-based "encoding" of secrets, and static or per-IP nonce values used in authentication routines.
  • Protocol analysis: Capture login traffic in a lab environment and inspect whether the same nonce or token values recur across multiple authentication attempts from the same IP.
  • Configuration and exposure checks: Inventory routers to identify those with this firmware version, and verify whether remote administration is exposed beyond trusted network segments.
  • Policy and CI checks (for firmware development): Enforce policies banning custom cryptographic schemes and requiring use of standard, reviewed cryptographic libraries and protocols.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Tymbark7372/MERCUSYS-AC12G/blob/master/advisories/CVE-2026-36609.md

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is exposed over the WAN or through a reachable path where an attacker can passively or actively capture authentication traffic. If management is restricted to a local, well-segmented network, the attacker typically needs local network access.

The attacker needs the ability to observe or intercept the encoded authentication exchange—such as being connected to the same LAN, performing traffic interception on a shared segment, or leveraging a misconfigured or exposed remote management endpoint.

Replace proprietary encoding and static nonces with standard, well-reviewed cryptographic protocols. Use TLS to protect authentication traffic, rely on secure server-side password verification, and ensure nonces or challenges are unique, unpredictable, and tied to individual sessions.

Avoid custom cryptographic designs, enforce use of vetted libraries and protocols, and subject authentication flows to security review and threat modeling. Design authentication so that passwords are never reversibly encoded on the wire, and apply defense-in-depth by restricting management access and monitoring for unusual administrative logins.

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