Summary
A session management vulnerability in SAML and OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication can cause one user to receive another user's authenticated session when multiple SSO login attempts occur at the same time. This may allow the affected user to access the other user's account or data without intentionally authenticating as that user.
Affected context
The issue can occur in applications that support SAML or OIDC authentication and process multiple SSO login flows concurrently. It is most relevant when temporary authentication state, callback handling, or session association is shared or insufficiently isolated between concurrent login attempts.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: SAML or OIDC single sign-on login and callback processing
- Required access: The ability to initiate or influence concurrent authentication attempts, generally through the application's normal login interface
- Trigger point: Overlapping SSO authentication flows being correlated with the wrong local session
- Why exploitation is possible: Authentication state is not reliably bound to the initiating browser session or transaction, allowing one completed login result to be associated with another user's session
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an inadequate association between an external identity-provider response and the local authentication transaction that initiated it. When concurrent SAML or OIDC login attempts share state, session identifiers, or callback-processing context without strong per-request binding, one user's authenticated result may be attached to another user's session.
This behavior maps to CWE-384: Session Fixation, broadly reflecting improper control over session identity and lifecycle during authentication. The insecure pattern is allowing a pre-existing or incorrectly correlated session context to remain authoritative across an authentication transition.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may receive access to another user's account
- Private account information may be exposed
- Attackers could perform actions using the incorrectly assigned session
- Authorization boundaries may be bypassed within the affected application
- Audit records could associate actions with the wrong user
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making every authentication transaction independently bound to the initiating client session.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Generate unpredictable, single-use state for each SAML or OIDC login transaction
- Bind callback state to the initiating browser session and intended redirect context
- Rotate or regenerate the application session after successful authentication
- Reject reused, expired, missing, or cross-session authentication state
- Prevent shared mutable authentication context across concurrent requests
- Apply least privilege to sessions and require additional verification for sensitive actions
- Avoid exposing identity-provider responses or transaction identifiers to unrelated sessions
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis and code review for shared authentication state, reusable callback tokens, and session identifiers that are not rotated after login
- Concurrency testing of parallel SAML and OIDC login flows using distinct browser sessions and identities
- Review of callback handlers for strict state, nonce, relay-state, and session binding
- Monitoring for authentication events where the identity, initiating session, device context, or callback transaction do not align
- Policy enforcement requiring single-use authentication transactions and session regeneration after login
- Neutral automated security review tools can help identify weak session correlation and lifecycle handling

