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CVE-2026-71302

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Session Fixation (CWE-384) in Web Authentication Flow

CVE-2026-71302

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Session Fixation

CWE:

CWE-384

Impact:

Session Takeover

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A session fixation vulnerability allows an attacker to establish or predict a session identifier before a victim authenticates. Because the application does not issue a new session ID after authentication, the attacker may reuse that identifier to access the victim's authenticated session.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in authentication flows that accept user-supplied session identifiers and retain them after a user successfully signs in. It becomes risky when an attacker can cause a victim to use a known session ID and can later present that same identifier to the application.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web session management and authentication endpoints
  • Required access: Ability to influence or establish a session identifier used by the victim
  • Trigger point: Successful authentication without session ID regeneration
  • Why exploitation is possible: The pre-authentication session remains associated with the authenticated account, allowing reuse by someone who knows the identifier

Why this happens

The application treats a client-provided or pre-authentication session identifier as trustworthy and fails to rotate it when authentication changes the session's privilege state. This behavior maps to CWE-384: Session Fixation, where an attacker can cause a known session identifier to remain valid after the victim authenticates.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may take over a victim's authenticated session
  • Unauthorized access to account data or functions may occur
  • Actions could be performed under the victim's identity
  • Sensitive information may be exposed or modified
  • Account or application integrity can be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on making session identifiers server-generated, unpredictable, and bound to the correct authentication state.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Regenerating the session ID immediately after successful authentication and privilege changes
  • Rejecting or replacing user-supplied session identifiers rather than adopting them
  • Invalidating the pre-authentication session when creating an authenticated session
  • Applying secure cookie attributes, appropriate expiration, and server-side session invalidation
  • Limiting session privileges before authentication and applying least privilege after authentication
  • Reducing reliance on client-controlled session state and enforcing centralized session-management policies

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect session fixation risks through:

  • Static analysis checks for authentication code that preserves session IDs across login transitions
  • Code review of session creation, login, privilege elevation, and logout paths
  • Dynamic tests that compare session identifiers before and after authentication
  • Policy enforcement requiring session rotation whenever authentication or authorization state changes
  • Monitoring for concurrent or unusual reuse of the same session identifier across clients or locations

Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify missing session rotation and unsafe acceptance of client-controlled identifiers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-272-02.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-272-02
toptech.comtoptech.com/blog/tms7-version-7-8-strengthens-security

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable remotely when an attacker can influence the session identifier used by a victim and later submit that identifier to the application. The exact scope depends on how sessions are created, delivered, and protected.

Not necessarily. The key requirement is the ability to establish or influence a pre-authentication session identifier and obtain its value or cause it to be used by the victim.

Generate a new, unpredictable server-side session identifier after successful authentication and invalidate the prior unauthenticated session.

Use centralized session-management controls, reject client-defined identifiers, rotate tokens after authentication and privilege changes, and test session behavior across login and logout transitions.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.