Summary
Omnispace Agora contains a session fixation flaw in which an attacker can establish a known session identifier in a victim's browser before the victim authenticates. If the application does not replace that identifier after successful login, the attacker may reuse it to access the victim's authenticated session.
Omnispace Agora contains a session fixation flaw in which an attacker can establish a known session identifier in a victim's browser before the victim authenticates. If the application does not replace that identifier after successful login, the attacker may reuse it to access the victim's authenticated session.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Agora deployments where a session identifier can be planted or influenced before authentication and the same identifier remains valid after login. It is particularly risky when session management does not rotate identifiers at authentication boundaries or otherwise bind authenticated sessions to trusted server-side state.
The vulnerability affects Agora deployments where a session identifier can be planted or influenced before authentication and the same identifier remains valid after login. It is particularly risky when session management does not rotate identifiers at authentication boundaries or otherwise bind authenticated sessions to trusted server-side state.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The application's session-management and authentication flows
- Required access: Ability to place or cause a known session identifier to be used by the victim's browser
- Trigger point: Successful victim authentication without session identifier regeneration
- Why exploitation is possible: The attacker already knows the identifier that becomes associated with the authenticated session
- Attack surface: The application's session-management and authentication flows
- Required access: Ability to place or cause a known session identifier to be used by the victim's browser
- Trigger point: Successful victim authentication without session identifier regeneration
- Why exploitation is possible: The attacker already knows the identifier that becomes associated with the authenticated session
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to invalidate or regenerate an anonymous session identifier when authentication succeeds. This allows an identifier selected or known before login to transition into an authenticated session, matching CWE-384: Session Fixation. The insecure pattern is treating a pre-authentication session token as trustworthy after an identity change.
The underlying bug is a failure to invalidate or regenerate an anonymous session identifier when authentication succeeds. This allows an identifier selected or known before login to transition into an authenticated session, matching CWE-384: Session Fixation. The insecure pattern is treating a pre-authentication session token as trustworthy after an identity change.
Potential impact
- An attacker may gain unauthorized access to the victim's authenticated session.
- The attacker could access account data and actions available to that session.
- The attacker may perform transactions or change account settings within the victim's privileges.
- Compromised sessions can enable further abuse of connected application functionality.
- An attacker may gain unauthorized access to the victim's authenticated session.
- The attacker could access account data and actions available to that session.
- The attacker may perform transactions or change account settings within the victim's privileges.
- Compromised sessions can enable further abuse of connected application functionality.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on rotating session identifiers whenever authentication state changes, especially after successful login or privilege elevation. Applications commonly invalidate the pre-authentication session, issue a new unpredictable identifier, and avoid accepting attacker-selected identifiers as authenticated credentials. Secure cookie attributes, server-side session storage, short session lifetimes, and least-privilege authorization reduce exposure if a token is disclosed. Authentication flows should also minimize trust in client-controlled session state and apply consistent controls across alternate login paths.
Mitigation generally centers on rotating session identifiers whenever authentication state changes, especially after successful login or privilege elevation. Applications commonly invalidate the pre-authentication session, issue a new unpredictable identifier, and avoid accepting attacker-selected identifiers as authenticated credentials. Secure cookie attributes, server-side session storage, short session lifetimes, and least-privilege authorization reduce exposure if a token is disclosed. Authentication flows should also minimize trust in client-controlled session state and apply consistent controls across alternate login paths.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis and code review for authentication paths that preserve session identifiers, reuse pre-login session objects, or omit session invalidation after login. Dynamic testing can verify that a pre-authentication token is no longer valid or does not become authenticated after a successful login. Security policies may require session rotation at authentication and privilege transitions, while automated application security testing can check cookie and token lifecycle behavior.
Detection can include static analysis and code review for authentication paths that preserve session identifiers, reuse pre-login session objects, or omit session invalidation after login. Dynamic testing can verify that a pre-authentication token is no longer valid or does not become authenticated after a successful login. Security policies may require session rotation at authentication and privilege transitions, while automated application security testing can check cookie and token lifecycle behavior.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| agora-project. | agora-project.net/ |
| vulncheck. | vulncheck.com/ |
