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CVE-2026-21682

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow in iccDEV

CVE-2026-21682

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-122

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A heap-based buffer overflow in the iccDEV library's CIccXmlArrayType::ParseText() routine can be triggered when parsing crafted ICC color profiles or associated XML text.

An attacker who can supply or influence ICC profiles processed by vulnerable applications may cause memory corruption, potentially leading to crashes or remote code execution within the consuming process.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in applications that integrate the iccDEV library (versions prior to 2.3.1.2) to parse and manipulate ICC color profiles, especially where XML-like or text-based profile content is handled by CIccXmlArrayType::ParseText().

It is most relevant in scenarios where ICC profiles can originate from untrusted or semi-trusted sources, such as user-uploaded files, imported assets, or externally supplied media content.

The risk is reduced when all processed profiles are tightly controlled, validated, and originate from trusted, internal pipelines.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any code path that invokes iccDEV's ICC profile parsing on attacker-controlled or influenced data.
  • Required access: Ability to supply, upload, or otherwise cause processing of a malicious ICC profile or associated XML/text content by the vulnerable application.
  • Trigger point: Parsing of malformed array or text fields by CIccXmlArrayType::ParseText(), leading to heap memory writes beyond allocated bounds.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient input validation and bounds checking (CWE-20) allow crafted input to drive logic that writes outside heap-allocated buffers (CWE-122), corrupting adjacent memory.

Why this happens

The core issue lies in improper validation of text or array data lengths before writing into heap-allocated buffers inside CIccXmlArrayType::ParseText().

The parsing logic assumes input size or structure is well-formed and does not consistently verify that the destination buffer is large enough for the parsed content.

This pattern maps to CWE-122: Heap-Based Buffer Overflow, with contributing CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, as untrusted ICC profile data is trusted without strict bounds and structural enforcement.

As a result, specially crafted profile fields can cause the parser to overrun heap buffers and corrupt process memory.

Potential impact

  • Application crashes when processing a malicious ICC profile (denial of service).
  • Arbitrary code execution in the context of the application using iccDEV.
  • Data corruption in memory, potentially impacting image processing results or neighboring data structures.
  • Security boundary bypass if the affected process has elevated privileges or access to sensitive resources.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation strategies generally focus on strict input handling and defensive memory management when integrating native libraries:

  • Treat all ICC profiles and related XML/text inputs as untrusted unless they come from tightly controlled sources.
  • Apply robust input validation and length checks before invoking low-level parsing APIs, rejecting malformed or unusually large profiles.
  • Use defensive coding patterns in native components: centralized bounds-checking helpers, size-aware operations, and explicit limits on array lengths and string sizes.
  • Run profile parsing and color management logic with least privilege, ideally in a sandboxed or isolated process to contain potential memory corruption.
  • Enforce conservative resource limits (e.g., maximum profile size, maximum number of elements) to reduce the attack surface exposed to parsers.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for similar memory corruption issues by:

  • Using static analysis tools configured with rules for buffer bounds, pointer arithmetic, and unchecked copies, particularly around parsing functions like ParseText().
  • Incorporating secure coding guidelines and code review checklists that flag manual buffer management, dynamic allocations, and parsing logic that lacks explicit length checks.
  • Running instrumented builds with memory sanitizers (e.g., AddressSanitizer, valgrind) against fuzzing suites targeting ICC profile parsing and XML/text handling entry points.
  • Logging and monitoring parsing failures, crashes, or abnormal termination when processing external profiles, and feeding these crashes into fuzzing and regression tests.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/178
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/pull/229
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-jq9m-54gr-c56c

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if an application using iccDEV accepts ICC profiles or related media from remote users (for example, through file uploads, document imports, or remote resources). In that case, a crafted file delivered over the network could trigger the issue during parsing.

An attacker needs the ability to cause the vulnerable application to parse a malicious ICC profile or associated text. This typically means upload or import permissions, or control over content that the application automatically processes (such as images or documents with embedded profiles).

Strengthen input validation and bounds checking around parsing routines, ensuring that buffer sizes are always checked against input lengths before writes occur. Additionally, favor safe memory handling abstractions and clear limits on profile sizes and array dimensions.

Adopt secure parsing patterns for all complex file formats: strictly validate structure and sizes before processing, employ fuzz testing and memory sanitizers on parsers, and establish coding standards that discourage unchecked buffer operations. Combine these with architectural defenses like sandboxing and least-privilege execution for components that process untrusted files.

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