/

CVE-2026-22047

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow in iccDEV ICC

CVE-2026-22047

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-130, CWE-252, CWE-787

Impact:

Potential Remote Code Execution and Application Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A heap-based buffer overflow in iccDEV's ICC profile processing logic allows memory beyond allocated buffers to be overwritten when SIccCalcOp::Describe() handles crafted profile data.

If an attacker can supply or influence ICC color profiles consumed by applications using vulnerable iccDEV versions, this memory corruption can potentially lead to crashes, data corruption, or arbitrary code execution in the calling process.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in applications that integrate the iccDEV library (versions prior to 2.3.1.2) to parse, inspect, or manipulate ICC color management profiles.

It is most relevant when ICC profiles can originate from external or untrusted sources, such as user-uploaded images, profiles bundled in documents, or files obtained from external workflows.

The issue resides in SIccCalcOp::Describe() in IccProfLib/IccMpeCalc.cpp, which is invoked during certain profile operations that generate descriptive information about multi-process elements or calculation operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any application or service that uses iccDEV to load or process ICC profiles, including desktop applications, image processing pipelines, print workflows, or servers handling user-supplied media.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or modify ICC profiles consumed by the vulnerable application (e.g., uploading files, embedding ICC profiles in images/documents, or feeding input through automated processing jobs).
  • Trigger point: Invocation of logic that calls SIccCalcOp::Describe() on attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced profile data.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient validation of profile data and incorrect assumptions about buffer sizes and content length allow writes beyond heap-allocated memory, creating a controllable memory corruption condition.

Why this happens

The root cause maps to CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write combined with CWE-20: Improper Input Validation and CWE-130: Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency.

In SIccCalcOp::Describe(), the implementation likely trusts length or count values derived from ICC profile structures without robust bounds checking against the actual allocated heap buffer.

When crafted profile data provides inconsistent sizes, counts, or string lengths, the function can write past the end of a destination buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.

The absence of thorough error handling (CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value) or defensive checks when parsing untrusted binary structures further contributes to the unsafe pattern, as invalid or extreme values are not gracefully rejected.

Potential impact

  • Application crashes due to heap corruption, leading to denial of service.
  • Potential execution of attacker-controlled code within the context of the application using iccDEV.
  • Data corruption in memory, potentially impacting image processing results or other in-process data structures.
  • Security boundary erosion if the vulnerable application runs with elevated privileges or as part of a larger processing pipeline.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically centers on robust input handling and safer memory management patterns when parsing binary formats like ICC profiles:

  • Enforce strict bounds checking: Validate all length fields, counts, and offsets from ICC profile data before using them to index buffers or construct strings; reject profiles with inconsistent or out-of-range values.
  • Use safer buffer APIs: Prefer abstractions that track buffer length explicitly and provide checked write operations (e.g., bounded copy/format functions, safe string builders, or container types that enforce capacity).
  • Harden parsing logic: Implement defensive parsing that treats ICC profiles as untrusted input: fail fast on malformed structures, unexpected segment sizes, or invalid numeric ranges.
  • Apply least-privilege principles: Run applications and processing services that handle external profiles with minimal privileges, sandboxing, and isolation to limit blast radius if memory corruption is triggered.
  • Centralize profile validation: Where feasible, introduce a dedicated validation layer for ICC profiles that normalizes and verifies data before it is passed to lower-level library routines.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and manage this class of vulnerability by combining automated and manual approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure static analysis tools to flag array and buffer writes that are not clearly bounded by explicit size checks, as well as uses of unvalidated length or count fields derived from file data.
  • Code review patterns: During review, pay special attention to binary parsing code in IccProfLib and similar modules, ensuring that every read of profile metadata is followed by range and consistency checks before being used for allocations or writes.
  • Fuzz testing: Apply coverage-guided fuzzing to ICC profile parsing and description functions to surface out-of-bounds writes, assertion failures, and other memory safety issues.
  • Runtime protections: Utilize sanitizing builds (e.g., AddressSanitizer or similar tools) in pre-production environments to catch heap-buffer-overflow conditions triggered by malformed test profiles.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/454
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/pull/459
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-22q7-8347-79m5

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how the iccDEV library is integrated. If an application automatically processes ICC profiles from untrusted or semi-trusted sources (such as uploaded images, documents, or print jobs), the risk is higher because attackers can more easily supply crafted inputs. In tightly controlled workflows where all profiles are curated and trusted, the practical risk is lower, though not eliminated.

An attacker generally needs the ability to provide or influence ICC profiles handled by a vulnerable application. This might be via file uploads, API endpoints that accept media, or any pipeline that ingests external images or documents containing embedded profiles. Direct code execution on the target is not required; the attack is carried out through malformed data.

The safest pattern is to adopt a version of the library where the parsing and description logic enforces strict bounds checking and handles malformed data gracefully, combined with your own defensive validation around ICC profile inputs. Conceptually, treat all profile metadata as untrusted, verify it against expected limits, and avoid writing to buffers unless you have confirmed that sizes and indices are within valid ranges.

Prevention relies on secure parsing design: always validate all externally sourced lengths and indices, use memory-safe abstractions where possible, integrate static analysis and fuzzing into your development lifecycle, and enforce coding standards that disallow unchecked buffer writes. Regular security-focused code reviews for binary format parsers are particularly effective at catching emerging issues early.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.