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CVE-2026-24406

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow in iccDEV

CVE-2026-24406

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Memory Corruption / Heap Buffer Overflow

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-122

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

iccDEV versions 2.3.1.1 and earlier contain a heap buffer overflow in the CIccTagNamedColor2::SetSize() method, triggered when untrusted data is used to build or modify ICC color profile structures.

An attacker who can supply crafted ICC profiles or other structured binary blobs may cause crashes, corrupt heap data, bypass application logic, or potentially execute arbitrary code in the context of the consuming application.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in software that uses iccDEV libraries (≤ 2.3.1.1) to parse, manipulate, or apply ICC color management profiles, particularly when ICC data originates from files, network sources, or other untrusted inputs.

It is most relevant in applications that automatically process user-supplied images or ICC profiles—such as imaging pipelines, printers, design tools, or servers performing color transformations—without strict validation of profile sizes and tag structures before calling CIccTagNamedColor2::SetSize().

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any code path that calls CIccTagNamedColor2::SetSize() on data influenced by external inputs (e.g., ICC profiles embedded in images, standalone .icc/.icm files, or other binary blobs).
  • Required access: Ability to provide or modify ICC profile data processed by the application (uploading a file, sending an image over an API, feeding data via print/spool queues, or opening an attacker-controlled document).
  • Trigger point: Parsing or resizing of NamedColor2 tags, where length or count fields from the profile control memory allocation or copying in SetSize().
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input-derived size values are not adequately validated against buffer bounds, allowing heap memory to be overrun during allocation, initialization, or data copy operations, leading to memory corruption.

Why this happens

This issue is a classic heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) caused by insufficient validation of user-controlled size or count fields within the ICC profile's NamedColor2 tag, combined with improper bounds checking when allocating or writing to heap buffers in CIccTagNamedColor2::SetSize().

The logic trusts profile metadata to represent safe sizes, rather than enforcing strict upper limits, cross-field consistency checks, and overflow-safe arithmetic.

CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) is implicated because the library does not robustly validate that the requested structure size is reasonable, consistent with the overall profile, and within safe memory bounds, which enables the memory corruption condition.

Potential impact

  • Application or service crashes, leading to denial of service when processing crafted ICC profiles.
  • Heap memory corruption that may enable arbitrary code execution under certain allocator and platform conditions.
  • Manipulation of in-memory data structures, potentially bypassing application logic or security checks.
  • Corruption of image or document processing results, leading to incorrect output or data integrity issues.
  • Use as a pivot to further compromise the host if code execution is achieved in a privileged or network-facing component.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on strengthening input validation and memory safety around structured binary data like ICC profiles:

  • Treat all ICC profile data and embedded color tags as untrusted, particularly when sourced from files, network traffic, or user submissions.
  • Enforce strict bounds checking on all size, count, and offset fields before using them in allocations, pointer arithmetic, or copy operations.
  • Implement sanity limits on profile and tag sizes (e.g., maximum number of colors, maximum tag size) independent of attacker-controlled metadata.
  • Use overflow-safe arithmetic when calculating buffer sizes (e.g., checking for multiplication and addition overflow before allocation).
  • Prefer safer allocation and copy abstractions that track lengths explicitly and fail closed on inconsistencies.
  • Run components that parse ICC profiles with least privilege and in isolation where feasible (e.g., sandboxed workers) to limit blast radius if an overflow occurs.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can blend static analysis, dynamic testing, and code review practices:

  • Apply static analysis rules focused on:
  • Use of attacker-influenced length/count fields in memory allocation and copy routines.
  • Arithmetic on size_t or integer fields derived from parsed binary structures without overflow checks.
  • Loops or memcpy-like operations where bounds are controlled by unvalidated profile metadata.
  • During code review, flag patterns where:
  • Parsed binary fields are used directly as buffer sizes or index limits.
  • There are no checks for maximum allowed tag sizes or number of entries.
  • Error handling paths do not cover inconsistent or truncated profile data.
  • Use fuzzing frameworks to fuzz ICC profile parsers with random and mutation-based inputs, observing for crashes, heap corruption reports, and sanitizer findings.
  • Integrate memory-safety tooling (AddressSanitizer, Valgrind, similar) into CI test runs for components handling ICC profiles to surface heap overflows early.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/commit/90c71cba2c563b1f5dc84197f827540d1baaea67
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/issues/480
github.comgithub.com/InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV/security/advisories/GHSA-h9h3-45cm-j95f

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how an application uses iccDEV. If it automatically processes untrusted ICC profiles or images (e.g., web services, print servers, batch image processors), the attack surface is broad. In strictly controlled environments where only trusted profiles are allowed, the practical risk is lower but still present if profiles can be replaced or tampered with.

The attacker generally needs the ability to supply or influence ICC profile data that the vulnerable code will parse. This might be as simple as uploading or opening an image with an embedded profile, submitting a document, or placing a file into a directory or queue that the system processes.

The core fix is to enforce robust input validation and strict bounds checking before allocating or writing to buffers. All size and count fields parsed from binary data should be validated against conservative maximums, checked for arithmetic overflow, and cross-validated against the overall structure. Unsafe direct use of untrusted sizes in allocations or copies should be refactored into defensive helper routines.

Prevention relies on secure coding standards for binary parsing: mandate defensive parsing patterns, integrate static analysis for size/bounds issues, and require fuzzing and sanitizer-backed testing for parsers of complex formats like ICC. Additionally, enforce architectural controls—such as sandboxing parsers and minimizing privileges—so that even if a memory issue slips through, its impact is constrained.

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