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CVE-2026-92792

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in OpenNHP Attestation

CVE-2026-92792

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenNHP selects its trusted-execution attestation verifier based on an attacker-controlled test_purpose field in submitted evidence. By including this field and supplying an enrolled measurement and serial-number pair from the allowlist, an attacker may bypass intended attestation checks and obtain unauthorized access.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in OpenNHP deployments that use trusted-execution attestation to authorize access and choose a verifier based on fields supplied in attestation evidence. It becomes risky when the evidence can influence verifier selection and the fallback verifier does not enforce the same security guarantees as the intended attestation path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The OpenNHP attestation and access-control interface
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence attestation evidence
  • Trigger point: Processing evidence containing the test_purpose key
  • Additional condition: The attacker must provide an enrolled measurement and serial-number pair from the configured allowlist
  • Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled evidence determines verifier selection, causing the fallback path to be used without adequate assurance that the evidence is a legitimate test request

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authentication-design flaw in which security-critical verifier selection depends on an untrusted input field. The presence of test_purpose causes the FallbackVerifier to execute unconditionally, allowing the request to avoid the intended attestation verification process when matching allowlisted values are supplied. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the system can treat insufficiently verified evidence as proof of an authorized identity or execution state.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may bypass trusted-execution attestation
  • Unauthorized users or workloads could gain protected access
  • Access-control decisions may be based on unauthenticated evidence
  • Compromised workloads could use the bypass to reach sensitive services or data
  • Audit records could misrepresent the assurance level of an authorized session

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making verifier selection independent of attacker-controlled claims and ensuring every authorization path provides equivalent authentication assurance.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Select the verifier from trusted server-side policy or an authenticated protocol context
  • Treat fields such as test_purpose as metadata rather than authorization signals
  • Require cryptographic verification before accepting measurements, serial numbers, or execution-mode claims
  • Apply the same strict validation and authorization requirements to fallback and testing paths
  • Separate test environments and credentials from production trust domains
  • Use least-privilege identities and narrowly scoped allowlists for attestation-approved workloads
  • Record verifier selection and attestation outcomes for security auditing

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can include:

  • Static analysis and code review for verifier selection controlled by request fields
  • Searches for conditional branches that select authentication or authorization handlers from untrusted input
  • Tests that submit alternate evidence modes and confirm that every path requires cryptographic verification
  • Policy checks requiring server-side control over authentication-method selection
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected use of fallback or test verifiers in production
  • Alerts for repeated attestation attempts using test_purpose or unusual allowlisted measurement and serial-number combinations

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/OpenNHP/opennhp
github.comgithub.com/OpenNHP/opennhp/blob/v1.0.2/nhp/core/verifier/verifier.go#L27-L92
github.comgithub.com/OpenNHP/opennhp/issues/1732
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/opennhp-through-1.0.2-authentication-bypass-via-fallback-verifier

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable remotely when an attacker can submit attestation evidence to an OpenNHP access-control interface. The exact scope depends on network exposure and deployment policy.

The attacker generally needs the ability to initiate or influence an attestation request and provide evidence containing the relevant control field and an enrolled measurement and serial-number pair.

Verifier selection should be controlled by trusted server-side policy, while all submitted evidence should undergo cryptographic verification before it influences access decisions.

Treat authentication-method selection as security-sensitive, test fallback and test-mode paths as rigorously as primary paths, and enforce least privilege with monitoring for unexpected verifier use.

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