Summary
AgentScope's Agent Service may fail to properly authenticate requests when the X-User-ID argument is manipulated. Because the affected user ID handling can allow authentication checks to be bypassed, a remote attacker may gain access to functionality as an unauthenticated or unintended user.
AgentScope's Agent Service may fail to properly authenticate requests when the X-User-ID argument is manipulated. Because the affected user ID handling can allow authentication checks to be bypassed, a remote attacker may gain access to functionality as an unauthenticated or unintended user.
Affected context
The issue is reported in the get_current_user_id function in src/agentscope/app/deps.py, within the AgentScope Agent Service. Deployments may be at risk when this code handles remotely supplied X-User-ID values without reliably verifying the associated user or requiring authentication.
The issue is reported in the get_current_user_id function in src/agentscope/app/deps.py, within the AgentScope Agent Service. Deployments may be at risk when this code handles remotely supplied X-User-ID values without reliably verifying the associated user or requiring authentication.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The Agent Service must be reachable by the attacker.
- Required access: The reported behavior does not require prior authentication.
- Trigger point: Processing of a request that supplies or manipulates the
X-User-IDargument. - Why exploitation is possible: If the supplied identifier is trusted without an effective authentication check, the request may be treated as belonging to a user without verifying that identity.
- Attack surface: The Agent Service must be reachable by the attacker.
- Required access: The reported behavior does not require prior authentication.
- Trigger point: Processing of a request that supplies or manipulates the
X-User-IDargument. - Why exploitation is possible: If the supplied identifier is trusted without an effective authentication check, the request may be treated as belonging to a user without verifying that identity.
Why this happens
The reported flaw is an authentication-control weakness: identity information from a request may influence user resolution without sufficient verification. This aligns primarily with CWE-287: Improper Authentication and may also relate to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function when protected functionality can be reached without an authentication step. The underlying insecure pattern is treating a caller-controlled identity value as proof of identity.
The reported flaw is an authentication-control weakness: identity information from a request may influence user resolution without sufficient verification. This aligns primarily with CWE-287: Improper Authentication and may also relate to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function when protected functionality can be reached without an authentication step. The underlying insecure pattern is treating a caller-controlled identity value as proof of identity.
Potential impact
- An attacker may access functionality intended for authenticated users.
- Requests could be attributed to an unintended user identity.
- Unauthorized actions or exposure of user-scoped information may occur, depending on the service's permissions and data boundaries.
- An attacker may access functionality intended for authenticated users.
- Requests could be attributed to an unintended user identity.
- Unauthorized actions or exposure of user-scoped information may occur, depending on the service's permissions and data boundaries.
General mitigation guidance
Defensive approaches generally ensure that identity is established through a trusted authentication mechanism rather than a caller-controlled header.
Common patterns include:
- Deriving user identity from a validated authentication context.
- Treating
X-User-IDas untrusted unless it is set or cryptographically verified by a trusted gateway. - Applying authorization checks to every protected operation, including checks that bind the requested identity to the authenticated principal.
- Failing closed when authentication data is absent, invalid, or inconsistent.
- Limiting service and user privileges to the minimum needed.
Defensive approaches generally ensure that identity is established through a trusted authentication mechanism rather than a caller-controlled header.
Common patterns include:
- Deriving user identity from a validated authentication context.
- Treating
X-User-IDas untrusted unless it is set or cryptographically verified by a trusted gateway. - Applying authorization checks to every protected operation, including checks that bind the requested identity to the authenticated principal.
- Failing closed when authentication data is absent, invalid, or inconsistent.
- Limiting service and user privileges to the minimum needed.
How teams detect issues like this
Review authentication dependencies and request-handling code for identity values taken directly from headers or other caller-controlled inputs. Static analysis and code review can look for protected routes that rely on user identifiers without validating an authenticated principal. Policy checks can require authentication and authorization on sensitive endpoints; logs may also help identify requests where header identities do not match trusted authentication context.
Review authentication dependencies and request-handling code for identity values taken directly from headers or other caller-controlled inputs. Static analysis and code review can look for protected routes that rely on user identifiers without validating an authenticated principal. Policy checks can require authentication and authorization on sensitive endpoints; logs may also help identify requests where header identities do not match trusted authentication context.
