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CVE-2026-88018

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in rclone S3 Server

CVE-2026-88018

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized access to proxied S3 backends

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical authentication bypass in rclone's S3-serving mode can allow an unauthenticated network attacker to authenticate with an arbitrary access key and an empty signing secret.

When an authentication proxy is configured without an independent authentication key, the attacker may reach the backend selected by the proxy for the chosen identity.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in rclone deployments using rclone serve s3 with --auth-proxy enabled but without --auth-key. In this configuration, client-selected access key identifiers may be associated with empty secrets, while the authentication proxy receives the same identifier as both the user and authentication value. Risk depends on the backend resolution and authorization behavior implemented by the proxy.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible rclone S3 service
  • Required access: No prior authentication or valid credentials
  • Trigger point: Processing of an S3 request authenticated through the proxy and SigV4 middleware
  • Why exploitation is possible: The service accepts an attacker-selected access key identifier, validates the signature against an empty secret, and does not require an independent per-identity authentication secret

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authentication design flaw in which an externally supplied identity is treated as sufficient proof of authentication. When no independent authentication key is configured, the selected access key can be registered with an empty secret, allowing a request signed with that empty value to pass verification. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-287: Improper Authentication and also relates to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because access to protected backend functionality is not gated by a reliable credential.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may access S3 data exposed through the selected backend
  • Unauthorized users could read, modify, or delete objects, depending on backend permissions
  • Data could be altered, replaced, or deleted
  • The attacker could reach different backends by selecting identities recognized by the proxy
  • Compromised storage workflows could cause downstream data integrity or supply-chain impacts

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on requiring independent proof of identity before forwarding requests to storage backends.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require a non-empty, independently managed authentication secret for proxy-mediated identities
  • Avoid treating client-selected access key identifiers as authentication credentials
  • Validate identity-to-secret mappings before accepting SigV4 requests
  • Apply explicit authorization checks at both the proxy and storage backend
  • Run the service with least-privilege permissions and limit accessible buckets and operations
  • Restrict network exposure to trusted clients and administrative paths
  • Fail closed when authentication configuration is incomplete or ambiguous

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of issue through:

  • Configuration checks that flag S3 serving with an authentication proxy but no independent authentication key
  • Integration tests that reject arbitrary access key identifiers and empty-secret signatures
  • Static and configuration analysis for authentication values derived directly from client-controlled identities
  • Code review signals where identity fields are reused as passwords, secrets, or authentication tokens
  • Access-log monitoring for unknown access keys, repeated authentication failures, unusual backend selection, and unexpected object operations
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit credentials and least-privilege backend mappings

Automated security review tools may help identify missing-authentication paths and insecure identity-to-credential relationships.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rclone/rclone/commit/90595f34f27f569be6b27c57fe5ab65057d323bd
github.comgithub.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.1
github.comgithub.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. A network attacker may exploit the issue without local access when the rclone S3 service is reachable and the vulnerable authentication-proxy configuration is enabled.

No. The attacker can choose an access key identifier and use an empty signing secret when the service lacks an independent authentication key.

Require an independent, non-empty secret for authentication, validate credentials before proxy resolution, and ensure both the proxy and backend enforce authorization.

Treat client-provided identities as untrusted input, never reuse identity values as authentication secrets, fail closed on incomplete security configuration, and test negative authentication cases in CI and deployment validation.

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