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CVE-2026-88007

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in Traefik HTTP/3 Entrypoint

CVE-2026-88007

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized access and user impersonation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A connection-isolation flaw in Traefik's HTTP/3 entrypoint can cause backend connections authenticated for one client to be reused by another client.

When a backend uses connection-bound NTLM or Negotiate authentication with keep-alive enabled, an unrelated client may access victim-specific data or act with the victim's authenticated identity.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Traefik deployments that:

  • Enable an HTTP/3 entrypoint
  • Proxy requests to a backend using connection-bound NTLM or Negotiate authentication
  • Permit backend connection reuse through keep-alive
  • Rely on frontend connection context to maintain backend authentication isolation

Deployments without these combined conditions may not be exposed to the same connection-reuse behavior.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/3 traffic handled by a Traefik entrypoint
  • Required access: The ability to send requests through the affected proxy
  • Backend requirement: A service using connection-bound NTLM or Negotiate authentication
  • Configuration requirement: Backend keep-alive and reusable authenticated connections
  • Trigger point: Reuse of a backend connection across distinct frontend clients
  • Why exploitation is possible: The proxy may associate a shared backend transport with requests that should use separate per-connection authentication context

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from failing to attach a dedicated backend transport to each HTTP/3 frontend connection. As a result, the authentication-aware round tripper can use a shared transport rather than preserving isolation between client connections.

Connection-bound authentication protocols such as NTLM and Negotiate associate authorization state with a backend connection. Reusing that connection across unrelated clients can therefore cause one client's authenticated identity to be applied to another client's requests. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-287: Improper Authentication and is also related to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read data available only to another authenticated user
  • An attacker could send requests under a victim's authenticated identity
  • Confidential information may be disclosed
  • Unauthorized actions could be performed against backend services
  • Tenant or user isolation may be weakened
  • Compromised backend sessions could enable further application-level abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on preserving authentication-state isolation across frontend connections and reducing reliance on shared connection-bound transports.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Ensure each frontend connection receives an appropriately scoped backend transport when connection-bound authentication is used
  • Avoid sharing authenticated backend connections across unrelated users or tenants
  • Prefer authentication mechanisms designed for safe proxying and explicit request-level identity handling where practical
  • Disable backend keep-alive when connection reuse cannot be safely isolated
  • Apply least-privilege authorization at the backend rather than relying solely on proxy session context
  • Use secure-by-default HTTP/3 and authentication configuration templates
  • Document and enforce policies for connection reuse with NTLM or Negotiate services
  • Test authentication boundaries under concurrent, multi-user traffic

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Configuration reviews that identify HTTP/3 routes combined with NTLM or Negotiate backends and keep-alive
  • Static and policy analysis for shared transport usage in authentication-aware proxy code
  • Code review checks verifying that frontend connection context is propagated to backend transport creation
  • Integration tests that send concurrent requests from distinct identities and verify response and authorization isolation
  • Runtime monitoring for authenticated backend connections serving requests associated with multiple frontend identities
  • Automated security review rules that flag connection reuse where authentication state is connection-bound

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/commit/ff39c47d7459dec9cd8de63c1a4e7aa7315bdc1c
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13812
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qqjf-53cj-pwvv

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable by an external client that can send requests through an affected HTTP/3 proxy route, provided the required backend authentication and connection-reuse conditions are present.

No. The security risk arises because an authenticated backend connection associated with the victim may be reused for another client's request.

Preserve strict transport and authentication-state isolation between frontend connections, or avoid connection reuse when the backend protocol binds identity to a connection.

Test proxy authentication boundaries with concurrent users, review keep-alive behavior for connection-bound protocols, and enforce configuration policies that prevent unsafe combinations of HTTP/3, shared transports, and NTLM or Negotiate authentication.

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