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CVE-2026-86864

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Argument Injection (CWE-88) in pgAdmin 4 Backup Tool

CVE-2026-86864

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Argument Injection

CWE:

CWE-22, CWE-88

Impact:

Arbitrary File Write and Credential Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

pgAdmin 4's Backup tool passes a user-controlled database value directly to pg_dump without treating it as a literal database name. An authenticated user with the tools_backup permission may abuse this behavior to cause arbitrary file creation or overwriting and potentially redirect a backup connection to an attacker-controlled server, exposing stored database credentials.

Affected context

The issue occurs in pgAdmin 4 Backup tool deployments that append the requested database value directly to the pg_dump argument vector. It is relevant when an authenticated account has the tools_backup permission, including environments where that permission is available through the default User role, and when the pgAdmin process can write to or connect from the affected host.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The authenticated Backup tool request endpoint.
  • Required access: An authenticated user with the tools_backup permission.
  • Trigger point: Construction and execution of the pg_dump command for a backup job.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The database field is passed as an unvalidated positional argument, allowing option-like values and connection-string syntax to influence pg_dump and libpq behavior.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is failure to preserve the intended data-versus-options boundary when constructing a subprocess command. A client-controlled database value is appended to an argument vector without strict validation or a literal-value transport mechanism; getopt_long may interpret a dash-prefixed value as an option, while libpq may interpret an equals-containing value as a connection string. This maps primarily to CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command, with a related CWE-22 impact when attacker-controlled options redirect output outside the intended storage directory.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may create or overwrite files writable by the pgAdmin operating-system account.
  • An attacker could damage pgAdmin configuration data or other application files.
  • A backup connection may be redirected to an attacker-controlled database endpoint.
  • Stored database credentials may be disclosed through the redirected connection.
  • The pgAdmin host or connected data environment could suffer further compromise depending on process privileges and network access.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on keeping user-controlled values out of option-parsed argument positions and preserving literal data semantics.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Supplying database names through a dedicated environment variable or other API that treats them as literal values.
  • Applying strict allowlist validation for database identifiers and rejecting option-like or connection-string forms where appropriate.
  • Constructing subprocess arguments with explicit separation between fixed options and trusted data.
  • Restricting backup output to an application-managed directory with path and filesystem policy enforcement.
  • Running pgAdmin with a dedicated least-privilege operating-system account and minimal network permissions.
  • Limiting tools_backup access according to user need and protecting stored credentials from unnecessary exposure.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis findings where request parameters are appended directly to subprocess argument vectors.
  • Code review signals involving command construction, option parsing, database connection strings, or environment variables containing credentials.
  • Regression tests verifying that user-controlled database names are absent from option-sensitive argument positions and are passed through literal-value interfaces.
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected pg_dump options, writes outside approved backup directories, or outbound database connections to untrusted destinations.
  • Authorization-policy checks confirming that tools_backup is not broadly granted without a documented requirement.
  • Automated security review tools that identify command and argument injection patterns in subprocess execution paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10384

Frequently asked

questions

It can be reached through the pgAdmin web interface by an authenticated user who has the tools_backup permission; direct unauthenticated exploitation is not implied.

The attacker needs a valid pgAdmin account with permission to invoke the Backup tool. In some configurations, this permission is available through the default User role.

Treat the database name as a literal value rather than placing it in an option-parsed argument position. Dedicated environment-variable or API mechanisms, combined with strict validation, reduce both argument interpretation and connection-string expansion risks.

Review every subprocess boundary, separate trusted options from untrusted data, enforce least privilege, restrict output paths and network access, and add regression tests for option-like and connection-string-shaped inputs.

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