Summary
A critical argument injection flaw in the Netcore NR268 DDNS component may allow an attacker to influence arguments passed to the system process execution function execvp through the Hostname parameter. Because the affected endpoint can be reached remotely, a malicious request may alter command behavior when DDNS processing handles attacker-controlled input.
A critical argument injection flaw in the Netcore NR268 DDNS component may allow an attacker to influence arguments passed to the system process execution function execvp through the Hostname parameter. Because the affected endpoint can be reached remotely, a malicious request may alter command behavior when DDNS processing handles attacker-controlled input.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the DDNS functionality exposed by the /router/DDNSset.cgi endpoint on affected Netcore NR268 deployments. Risk depends on whether the endpoint is reachable by an untrusted remote client, whether the Hostname value is insufficiently constrained, and how that value is passed to execvp during DDNS configuration or update processing.
The issue occurs in the DDNS functionality exposed by the /router/DDNSset.cgi endpoint on affected Netcore NR268 deployments. Risk depends on whether the endpoint is reachable by an untrusted remote client, whether the Hostname value is insufficiently constrained, and how that value is passed to execvp during DDNS configuration or update processing.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable DDNS web endpoint - Required access: Access sufficient to submit or modify DDNS settings; the
exact requirement depends on device authentication and deployment controls
- Trigger point: Processing of the Hostname argument by DDNSset.cgi - Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input can influence the
argument vector supplied to execvp without adequate separation between data
and execution parameters
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable DDNS web endpoint - Required access: Access sufficient to submit or modify DDNS settings; the
exact requirement depends on device authentication and deployment controls
- Trigger point: Processing of the Hostname argument by DDNSset.cgi - Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input can influence the
argument vector supplied to execvp without adequate separation between data
and execution parameters
Why this happens
The underlying bug is inadequate validation and separation of attacker- controlled input before it is used as an argument to a process execution routine. This behavior maps to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, and more specifically CWE-88, Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command. The insecure pattern treats a request value as trusted process input rather than constraining it to an expected hostname format and constructing arguments through a safe, fixed interface.
The underlying bug is inadequate validation and separation of attacker- controlled input before it is used as an argument to a process execution routine. This behavior maps to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, and more specifically CWE-88, Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command. The insecure pattern treats a request value as trusted process input rather than constraining it to an expected hostname format and constructing arguments through a safe, fixed interface.
Potential impact
- An attacker may alter the behavior of DDNS-related system commands.
- The device may execute unintended operations with the privileges of the router service.
- Sensitive configuration or network information could be exposed.
- The device could be disrupted, reconfigured, or used as a foothold for further attacks.
- In some deployments, the flaw could lead to broader compromise of connected networks.
- An attacker may alter the behavior of DDNS-related system commands.
- The device may execute unintended operations with the privileges of the router service.
- Sensitive configuration or network information could be exposed.
- The device could be disrupted, reconfigured, or used as a foothold for further attacks.
- In some deployments, the flaw could lead to broader compromise of connected networks.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that user-controlled values cannot influence command structure or unintended process arguments. Secure-by-default designs use dedicated DDNS libraries or fixed executable interfaces instead of shell-like command construction, apply strict allowlist validation for hostnames, and reject malformed or unexpected input before processing. Input trust should be reduced at every boundary, and DDNS services should run with only the privileges and network access they require. Administrative access to the endpoint should also be limited through authentication, authorization, and network segmentation.
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that user-controlled values cannot influence command structure or unintended process arguments. Secure-by-default designs use dedicated DDNS libraries or fixed executable interfaces instead of shell-like command construction, apply strict allowlist validation for hostnames, and reject malformed or unexpected input before processing. Input trust should be reduced at every boundary, and DDNS services should run with only the privileges and network access they require. Administrative access to the endpoint should also be limited through authentication, authorization, and network segmentation.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis for request parameters flowing into execvp, exec-like APIs, command builders, or argument concatenation without strict validation. Code review should examine whether hostname and other DDNS fields are treated as structured data and whether argument vectors are fixed and independently constructed. Runtime monitoring can flag unusual DDNS requests, unexpected process launches, and changes to router configuration. CI policy checks and automated code-review tools may help identify unsafe command-argument data flows.
Detection can include static analysis for request parameters flowing into execvp, exec-like APIs, command builders, or argument concatenation without strict validation. Code review should examine whether hostname and other DDNS fields are treated as structured data and whether argument vectors are fixed and independently constructed. Runtime monitoring can flag unusual DDNS requests, unexpected process launches, and changes to router configuration. CI policy checks and automated code-review tools may help identify unsafe command-argument data flows.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
