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CVE-2026-85596

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in Traefik Ingress

CVE-2026-85596

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Access

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A TLS client-authentication configuration conflict in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider can cause a protected route to fall back to the entry point's default TLS settings. When this occurs, an attacker may reach a route configured to require a client certificate without presenting one. The issue affects the Traefik v3.7 line under specific conditions involving multiple Ingress objects with overlapping host and authentication settings.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Traefik deployments using the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider and client-certificate authentication through the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-tls-secret and related annotations. It requires multiple Ingress objects to share a host, client CA secret, and client-authentication mode while generating distinct TLS option names from their namespace and object names. Under those conditions, Traefik may detect a TLS options conflict and use the entry point's default TLS configuration, which may not request a client certificate.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A Traefik-published route using the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider
  • Required access: Network access to the affected host; no valid client certificate may be required when the bypass occurs
  • Trigger point: TLS option selection for overlapping Ingress objects sharing a host and client-authentication configuration
  • Why exploitation is possible: Conflicting generated TLS option names can cause Traefik to fall back to a default TLS configuration that does not request client certificates

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authentication enforcement failure caused by inconsistent identity and conflict handling for generated TLS options. TLS option names were derived from individual Ingress namespace and name values rather than being sufficiently aligned with the shared host and authentication configuration. When multiple objects produced a conflict, the fallback behavior selected a configuration that omitted the expected client-certificate request. This maps to CWE-287, Improper Authentication, because access-control authentication requirements were not consistently enforced for the protected route.

Potential impact

  • An unauthenticated client may reach routes intended to require a client certificate
  • Protected administrative or application endpoints could become accessible
  • Organizations may experience unauthorized data access or modification
  • Downstream trust assumptions based on mutual TLS could be bypassed
  • Exposed services could facilitate further application-layer attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that authentication requirements

remain deterministic when multiple configuration objects refer to the same

host.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use a single, unambiguous TLS authentication policy for each protected host
  • Avoid conflicting Ingress definitions that share hosts and client-authentication settings
  • Derive effective security policy from the host and authentication requirements rather than object identity alone
  • Fail closed when TLS option conflicts or policy ambiguity is detected
  • Validate rendered proxy configuration before deployment and after reconciliation
  • Apply least-privilege access controls to Kubernetes objects that can publish or modify Ingress resources
  • Maintain independent authorization checks at the application layer for sensitive routes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this condition through:

  • Configuration analysis that identifies duplicate hosts across Ingress objects
  • Static and policy checks for inconsistent client-authentication annotations
  • Review signals involving TLS option naming based only on namespace and resource identity
  • Automated tests verifying that protected routes reject connections without an approved client certificate
  • Runtime monitoring for TLS handshakes that omit client-certificate requests on routes expected to use mutual TLS
  • Admission policies that reject ambiguous or conflicting Ingress configurations
  • Configuration-diff checks that compare intended authentication settings with the effective proxy configuration

Neutral automated review tools may help identify conflicting host definitions and

authentication-policy regressions during CI or deployment review.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-j994-9gqj-9hwq
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-3.7-authentication-bypass-via-tls-option-conflict

Frequently asked

questions

It can be reachable over the network when an affected Traefik route is

exposed and the configuration conflict causes client-certificate

authentication to be skipped. Exploitability depends on the deployed

Ingress definitions and network exposure.

Not necessarily. A remote attacker may only need network access to the

affected host. Kubernetes permissions are generally relevant to creating

or modifying the conflicting configuration, not necessarily to accessing

the resulting route.

Ensure that each protected host has one unambiguous client-authentication

policy, prevent conflicting TLS options, and make configuration ambiguity

fail closed rather than selecting a weaker default.

Combine admission controls, configuration review, rendered-proxy testing,

runtime TLS monitoring, and application-level authorization. Tests should

verify that every route requiring mutual TLS actually requests and validates

an approved client certificate.

Find out what's already
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