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CVE-2026-82644

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Brute-Force Bypass (CWE-307) in WWBN AVideo Login Endpoint

CVE-2026-82644

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Unrestricted Password Guessing and Account Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo contains a rate-limiting bypass that prevents failed-login counters from being stored for clients identified as bots. An unauthenticated attacker may therefore make unlimited password-guessing attempts against the login endpoint and other protected endpoints when the request lacks a User-Agent header or uses a commonly identified bot User-Agent.

Affected context

The issue occurs in AVideo deployments where enforceRateLimit() relies on a cache-backed attempt counter and the request is classified as a bot by isBot(). Because bot classification includes missing User-Agent headers and common identifiers such as curl, bot, crawler, and spider, the counter may not be written for those requests. This affects login.json.php and other endpoints protected by the same rate-limiting logic.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible authentication and rate-limited HTTP

endpoints

  • Required access: No prior authentication is generally required - Trigger point: A request reaches enforceRateLimit() with a missing or

bot-like User-Agent value

  • Why exploitation is possible: Bot-classified requests can bypass the cache

write used to track attempts, preventing the configured threshold from

being reached

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from coupling abuse-prevention state with User-Agent-based bot detection. When isBot() classifies a client as a bot, ObjectYPT::setCacheGlobal does not persist the attempt counter, so enforceRateLimit() cannot accurately track repeated authentication failures. This behavior maps to CWE-307 because the application fails to reliably restrict repeated authentication attempts.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may perform unlimited password-guessing attempts
  • User accounts could be compromised when weak or reused passwords are targeted
  • Authentication-protected data or functionality may be accessed
  • Repeated attempts could increase account-lockout, logging, or service-load risks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally involves separating rate-limit accounting from User-Agent classification and ensuring every applicable request contributes to abuse-prevention state. Rate limiting can be enforced using server-side controls keyed by appropriate combinations of identity, source, session, and endpoint, with conservative handling of missing or untrusted headers. Authentication controls may also use bounded progressive delays, adaptive challenges, strong password policies, and multi-factor authentication. Counters and enforcement decisions should be protected from client influence, while privileged administrative and service accounts should have additional safeguards and least-privilege access.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches include static analysis for rate-limit branches that skip counter updates based on User-Agent or other client-controlled headers, and code review checks for cache writes that depend on bot classification. Runtime monitoring can compare authentication failures with recorded rate-limit counters, identify repeated attempts with absent or bot-like User-Agent values, and alert on accounts or sources exceeding expected thresholds. Policy enforcement can require server-side, fail-closed accounting for authentication attempts. Automated security review tools may help identify these control-flow and trust-boundary patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-6893-mcgv-9p2x
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/wwbn-avideo-brute-force-rate-limiting-bypass-via-missing-user-agent

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An unauthenticated attacker may reach the affected HTTP endpoints over

the network when the AVideo deployment exposes them and the vulnerable

rate-limiting behavior applies.

Not necessarily. The primary risk is unrestricted guessing against login

accounts, although the practical impact depends on the application's

authentication configuration and password strength.

Ensure that every relevant authentication attempt is counted independently of

User-Agent classification, using server-side rate-limit state and controls

that cannot be suppressed by client-controlled headers.

Test rate limits with missing, altered, and bot-like headers; review all

branches that update enforcement state; monitor failed-authentication

telemetry; and combine rate limiting with strong credentials and

multi-factor authentication.

Find out what's already
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