Summary
WWBN AVideo contains a rate-limiting bypass that prevents failed-login counters from being stored for clients identified as bots. An unauthenticated attacker may therefore make unlimited password-guessing attempts against the login endpoint and other protected endpoints when the request lacks a User-Agent header or uses a commonly identified bot User-Agent.
Affected context
The issue occurs in AVideo deployments where enforceRateLimit() relies on a cache-backed attempt counter and the request is classified as a bot by isBot(). Because bot classification includes missing User-Agent headers and common identifiers such as curl, bot, crawler, and spider, the counter may not be written for those requests. This affects login.json.php and other endpoints protected by the same rate-limiting logic.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible authentication and rate-limited HTTP
endpoints
- Required access: No prior authentication is generally required - Trigger point: A request reaches enforceRateLimit() with a missing or
bot-like User-Agent value
- Why exploitation is possible: Bot-classified requests can bypass the cache
write used to track attempts, preventing the configured threshold from
being reached
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from coupling abuse-prevention state with User-Agent-based bot detection. When isBot() classifies a client as a bot, ObjectYPT::setCacheGlobal does not persist the attempt counter, so enforceRateLimit() cannot accurately track repeated authentication failures. This behavior maps to CWE-307 because the application fails to reliably restrict repeated authentication attempts.
Potential impact
- Attackers may perform unlimited password-guessing attempts
- User accounts could be compromised when weak or reused passwords are targeted
- Authentication-protected data or functionality may be accessed
- Repeated attempts could increase account-lockout, logging, or service-load risks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally involves separating rate-limit accounting from User-Agent classification and ensuring every applicable request contributes to abuse-prevention state. Rate limiting can be enforced using server-side controls keyed by appropriate combinations of identity, source, session, and endpoint, with conservative handling of missing or untrusted headers. Authentication controls may also use bounded progressive delays, adaptive challenges, strong password policies, and multi-factor authentication. Counters and enforcement decisions should be protected from client influence, while privileged administrative and service accounts should have additional safeguards and least-privilege access.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static analysis for rate-limit branches that skip counter updates based on User-Agent or other client-controlled headers, and code review checks for cache writes that depend on bot classification. Runtime monitoring can compare authentication failures with recorded rate-limit counters, identify repeated attempts with absent or bot-like User-Agent values, and alert on accounts or sources exceeding expected thresholds. Policy enforcement can require server-side, fail-closed accounting for authentication attempts. Automated security review tools may help identify these control-flow and trust-boundary patterns.

