Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Improper Access Control (CWE-284) in MLflow Traces

CVE-2026-8147

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Data Access and Modification

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.0

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MLflow's trace API endpoints lack experiment-level authorization checks when authentication is enabled, allowing any logged-in user to access trace data across experiments.

Under these conditions, users can read, delete, or modify traces for experiments they are not authorized to access, potentially exposing sensitive information and corrupting audit trails.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in MLflow deployments that:

  • Use versions prior to 3.14.0
  • Run with authentication enabled and multiple users or services
  • Rely on experiment-level authorization policies for isolation of trace data

In such setups, trace endpoints are exposed through the MLflow tracking server, but are not consistently protected by the same authorization layer that governs experiments and runs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MLflow tracking server trace API endpoints
  • Required access: Any authenticated MLflow user account or API token
  • Trigger point: Invoking trace-related operations (read, update, delete) on experiments where the caller lacks experiment-level permissions
  • Why exploitation is possible: The _before_request handler does not register authorization validators for trace endpoints, so requests bypass experiment-level authorization checks and are processed as if fully permitted.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization gap in request handling logic rather than a flaw in authentication itself.

MLflow's _before_request middleware is responsible for wiring authorization validators to incoming requests, but trace-related routes are omitted from this validation pipeline.

This aligns with CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where resources are exposed without enforcing the intended authorization rules, allowing authenticated but unauthorized users to perform sensitive operations.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of sensitive trace data, including model behavior, debugging metadata, or operational context
  • Deletion of traces, undermining auditability and incident investigations
  • Unauthorized modification of trace records, enabling tampering with historical evidence or masking malicious activity
  • Cross-experiment data leakage between teams or tenants sharing the same MLflow instance
  • Erosion of trust in compliance, governance, and observability controls around ML experimentation

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on aligning authorization coverage across all API surfaces and reducing trust in any single authenticated identity.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Ensuring that every endpoint associated with experiments, runs, traces, and artifacts is consistently bound to the same authorization layer
  • Applying explicit resource-scoped permission checks in request handlers, rather than relying solely on global authentication
  • Designing trace operations to be secure-by-default, treating trace data as sensitive and subject to least-privilege access
  • Segmenting MLflow deployments by team or tenant where possible, to limit the blast radius of access control oversights
  • Auditing and documenting authorization assumptions so that new API routes must explicitly declare and implement their access control policies

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar access control gaps using:

  • Code review practices that verify all new routes pass through a centralized authorization mechanism and reference resource-level policies
  • Static analysis rules or linters that flag handler functions lacking calls to authorization checks or policy evaluation helpers
  • API-level security tests that attempt cross-tenant or cross-project access to sensitive endpoints, including traces, runs, and artifacts
  • Log and audit review to detect unusual access patterns, such as users interacting with traces from experiments they do not own
  • Periodic security assessments of MLflow configurations and custom extensions to ensure authorization consistency across features

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/f9b1eb510478570609ef451984a255775aa4b937
huntr.comhuntr.com/bounties/b00c3ddd-373e-492f-9bf0-41a28bb21ed5

Frequently asked

questions

It is exploitable by any authenticated user of the affected MLflow instance. Once logged in, a user can interact with trace endpoints for experiments they are not authorized to access, as trace operations are not properly enforced by experiment-level authorization.

An attacker needs valid authentication to the MLflow tracking server—such as a user account or API token—but does not need explicit permissions on the target experiments. The missing authorization validators allow them to bypass those experiment-level controls for trace operations.

The safest approach is to ensure that all trace endpoints are integrated into the same centralized authorization mechanism used for experiments and runs. Each trace request should be evaluated against resource-specific policies, and no route should process a request before authorization is verified.

Prevention typically involves adopting a security-by-design approach for APIs: require that new endpoints explicitly declare their authorization requirements, enforce least privilege at the resource level, use centralized middleware for auth checks, and incorporate automated tests and code review policies that fail changes when authorization is missing or inconsistent.

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