Summary
An insecure-permissions vulnerability in wbpxre150 Shopping List v11.0 may allow an unauthorized caller to invoke an exported application component. If the component accepts requests without sufficient authorization checks, an attacker could manipulate shopping-list data.
An insecure-permissions vulnerability in wbpxre150 Shopping List v11.0 may allow an unauthorized caller to invoke an exported application component. If the component accepts requests without sufficient authorization checks, an attacker could manipulate shopping-list data.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the Android Shopping List application when a component is exported and exposed through the platform's interprocess communication mechanisms without adequately restricting callers. Risk depends on the component's visibility, its permission configuration, and whether it performs shopping-list operations without verifying the caller's authorization.
The issue occurs in the Android Shopping List application when a component is exported and exposed through the platform's interprocess communication mechanisms without adequately restricting callers. Risk depends on the component's visibility, its permission configuration, and whether it performs shopping-list operations without verifying the caller's authorization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: An exported Android application component
- Required access: Ability to interact with the component through the Android application or IPC framework; valid user authentication may not be required if no effective permission is enforced
- Trigger point: Invocation of the exported component with a request that reaches shopping-list data operations
- Why exploitation is possible: The component's permissions or caller checks do not sufficiently restrict unauthorized access to supported operations
- Attack surface: An exported Android application component
- Required access: Ability to interact with the component through the Android application or IPC framework; valid user authentication may not be required if no effective permission is enforced
- Trigger point: Invocation of the exported component with a request that reaches shopping-list data operations
- Why exploitation is possible: The component's permissions or caller checks do not sufficiently restrict unauthorized access to supported operations
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an access-control design failure in which an externally invocable component is trusted without consistently enforcing authorization at the component or operation boundary.
This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because the application does not adequately restrict who may invoke a sensitive function or modify protected data. Export visibility, weak or missing manifest permissions, and insufficient runtime caller validation are common insecure patterns in this class.
The underlying bug is an access-control design failure in which an externally invocable component is trusted without consistently enforcing authorization at the component or operation boundary.
This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because the application does not adequately restrict who may invoke a sensitive function or modify protected data. Export visibility, weak or missing manifest permissions, and insufficient runtime caller validation are common insecure patterns in this class.
Potential impact
- An unauthorized caller may modify shopping-list entries
- Application data integrity could be reduced
- Users may receive inaccurate or tampered shopping-list information
- The component could provide a pathway for broader abuse if it exposes additional privileged operations
- An unauthorized caller may modify shopping-list entries
- Application data integrity could be reduced
- Users may receive inaccurate or tampered shopping-list information
- The component could provide a pathway for broader abuse if it exposes additional privileged operations
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing component exposure and enforcing authorization consistently.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Keep components non-exported unless external invocation is required
- Apply narrowly scoped, signature-level permissions where protected cross-application access is necessary
- Validate the calling identity and authorization for every sensitive operation
- Enforce object-level checks so callers can modify only permitted records
- Minimize the privileges and data access available to exported components
- Treat all IPC inputs as untrusted and validate them against strict schemas and business rules
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing component exposure and enforcing authorization consistently.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Keep components non-exported unless external invocation is required
- Apply narrowly scoped, signature-level permissions where protected cross-application access is necessary
- Validate the calling identity and authorization for every sensitive operation
- Enforce object-level checks so callers can modify only permitted records
- Minimize the privileges and data access available to exported components
- Treat all IPC inputs as untrusted and validate them against strict schemas and business rules
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis of manifest files for exported components lacking appropriate permissions
- Code review checks for exported activities, services, receivers, or providers that perform data mutations
- Analysis of runtime authorization checks and caller-identity validation
- Mobile application security testing that inventories IPC entry points and tests unauthorized access
- Policy enforcement in CI pipelines requiring explicit justification and protection for exported components
- Automated mobile security scanners and code-review tools that flag exposed components or missing permission checks
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis of manifest files for exported components lacking appropriate permissions
- Code review checks for exported activities, services, receivers, or providers that perform data mutations
- Analysis of runtime authorization checks and caller-identity validation
- Mobile application security testing that inventories IPC entry points and tests unauthorized access
- Policy enforcement in CI pipelines requiring explicit justification and protection for exported components
- Automated mobile security scanners and code-review tools that flag exposed components or missing permission checks
