Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Unrestricted File Upload in MindsDB BYOM Integration

CVE-2026-7711

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Arbitrary File Upload

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MindsDB versions up to 26.01 contain an unrestricted file upload issue in the Engine Handler's exec function within mindsdb/integrations/handlers/byom_handler/proc_wrapper.py.

A remote attacker can abuse this weakness to upload arbitrary content through the BYOM (Bring Your Own Model) integration path, which may lead to execution of untrusted code or other follow-on attacks when these uploads are processed.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects MindsDB deployments that expose the BYOM (Bring Your Own Model) integration handler and rely on the Engine Handler's exec logic in proc_wrapper.py to receive and process user-supplied models or artifacts.

It is most relevant where users can remotely submit model packages, configuration files, or other assets that the backend accepts without strict file-type or content validation.

The risk grows when uploaded files are stored in locations later interpreted as executable code, loaded as Python modules, or otherwise trusted by the system.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remote interfaces (e.g., HTTP APIs, integration endpoints) that route requests to the BYOM Engine Handler.
  • Required access: Ability to invoke the BYOM handler's exec path (often via an authenticated or semi-trusted integration, depending on deployment configuration).
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted uploads (models or artifacts) that are accepted by exec without adequate restriction or validation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler does not sufficiently enforce authorization or constraint checks (CWE-284) and allows files to be uploaded or stored without type, size, or destination enforcement (CWE-434), enabling arbitrary content to be introduced into the runtime environment.

Why this happens

The core issue stems from the Engine Handler's exec function treating user-supplied artifacts as trusted without applying strict access control or content validation.

This maps to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, where a component accepts files that can later be interpreted or executed, and CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the system does not sufficiently restrict who can perform sensitive upload operations or under what conditions.

Conceptually, the handler lacks a clear separation between untrusted input and trusted execution paths, allowing uploaded artifacts to influence code execution, filesystem state, or model loading behavior beyond their intended scope.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may upload arbitrary files, including scripts, models, or configuration artifacts, into the server environment.
  • Uploaded content could be executed or loaded as code, potentially leading to remote code execution.
  • An attacker could plant backdoored models or tampered artifacts, resulting in data integrity issues or model poisoning.
  • Sensitive system files or directories could be overwritten where write permissions allow, leading to service disruption or privilege escalation.
  • Malicious uploads might be leveraged as a foothold for lateral movement in the broader infrastructure.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening both upload constraints and access controls around the Engine Handler:

  • Introduce strict input validation and file-type whitelisting for all artifacts processed by the BYOM handler, rejecting unexpected formats or structures.
  • Enforce clear authorization checks so that only appropriately privileged users or services can invoke the exec path and perform uploads.
  • Store uploaded files in segregated, non-executable directories with minimal filesystem permissions, avoiding direct placement in code or library paths.
  • Apply content-level checks such as manifest validation, signature verification, or checksum comparison before trusting any uploaded model or artifact.
  • Run the Engine Handler under least-privilege accounts and with sandboxing or containerization where practical, reducing the blast radius if a malicious upload is accepted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection usually involves combining code-level review with operational monitoring:

  • Use static analysis or code review to identify file upload paths that lack explicit type checks, destination constraints, or authorization logic.
  • Define secure coding guidelines requiring validation of all uploaded artifacts, and enforce these through pull request templates or automated linters.
  • Monitor logs for unusual upload patterns, such as unexpected file types, large volumes of uploads, or uploads originating from atypical clients.
  • Implement security controls that flag or block uploads containing suspicious content (e.g., executable headers, embedded scripts) even when the interface is intended for models.
  • Periodically audit the storage locations used for uploaded artifacts to detect anomalous files or directories.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nn0nkey/JD-Security-SHENYI-Team/blob/main/MindsDB_BYOM_RCE.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/806822
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360887
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/360887/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the issue can be exploited remotely through interfaces that expose the BYOM Engine Handler's exec functionality, allowing attackers to submit malicious uploads if they can reach that endpoint.

The required access depends on how the BYOM interface is deployed. In many cases, an attacker must be able to invoke the relevant API or integration endpoint, which may or may not require authentication; improper access control increases the likelihood that low-privileged or unauthenticated users can exploit it.

The most robust pattern is to strictly gate the upload functionality with proper authorization checks, implement strong validation and whitelisting for uploaded content, and ensure uploaded files are stored in non-executable, segregated locations that cannot influence application code paths.

Adopt a consistent file-upload security model: treat all uploads as untrusted, enforce strict type and destination controls, apply least-privilege permissions to components handling uploads, and integrate security reviews and automated checks focused on file handling and access control into the development lifecycle.

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