Summary
A vulnerability in the move_uploaded_file handling of admin/add_logs.php in cak-filemanagement-system allows remotely supplied files to be uploaded without adequate restrictions. If an attacker can reach the affected functionality, they may upload files that could be stored or processed in unsafe locations, with the eventual impact depending on server configuration and file execution behavior.
A vulnerability in the move_uploaded_file handling of admin/add_logs.php in cak-filemanagement-system allows remotely supplied files to be uploaded without adequate restrictions. If an attacker can reach the affected functionality, they may upload files that could be stored or processed in unsafe locations, with the eventual impact depending on server configuration and file execution behavior.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments of cak-filemanagement-system versions through the identified affected revision where the admin/add_logs.php endpoint processes the File argument through move_uploaded_file. Risk increases when the endpoint is remotely reachable, upload destinations are web-accessible or executable, and the application does not enforce strong file-type, filename, size, and destination controls.
The issue occurs in deployments of cak-filemanagement-system versions through the identified affected revision where the admin/add_logs.php endpoint processes the File argument through move_uploaded_file. Risk increases when the endpoint is remotely reachable, upload destinations are web-accessible or executable, and the application does not enforce strong file-type, filename, size, and destination controls.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible file-handling functionality in
admin/add_logs.php - Required access: Ability to submit a request to the affected upload workflow; authentication requirements depend on the application's access controls
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Fileargument and movement of the uploaded content - Why exploitation is possible: The upload path does not sufficiently restrict the content or destination of user-supplied files, allowing potentially dangerous files to be accepted
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible file-handling functionality in
admin/add_logs.php - Required access: Ability to submit a request to the affected upload workflow; authentication requirements depend on the application's access controls
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Fileargument and movement of the uploaded content - Why exploitation is possible: The upload path does not sufficiently restrict the content or destination of user-supplied files, allowing potentially dangerous files to be accepted
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an unrestricted file-upload pattern in which user-controlled upload content is moved into application-managed storage without comprehensive validation and authorization controls. This maps primarily to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The related CWE-284: Improper Access Control classification may apply where upload permissions or destination access are not adequately constrained.
The underlying flaw is an unrestricted file-upload pattern in which user-controlled upload content is moved into application-managed storage without comprehensive validation and authorization controls. This maps primarily to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The related CWE-284: Improper Access Control classification may apply where upload permissions or destination access are not adequately constrained.
Potential impact
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded files could be used to overwrite or interfere with application data
- If executable content reaches an executable directory, the attacker could achieve server-side code execution
- The application may experience data exposure, defacement, or availability issues
- Uploaded content could be used as a staging point for further attacks
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded files could be used to overwrite or interfere with application data
- If executable content reaches an executable directory, the attacker could achieve server-side code execution
- The application may experience data exposure, defacement, or availability issues
- Uploaded content could be used as a staging point for further attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in uploaded content and separating upload handling from executable application paths.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only narrowly defined file types based on validated content rather than client-provided names or MIME types
- Applying strict filename, size, extension, and content validation before storage
- Generating server-side filenames and ignoring attacker-controlled paths
- Storing uploads outside web-accessible and executable directories where feasible
- Enforcing authorization checks for upload operations and destination selection
- Serving uploaded content with restrictive response headers and least-privilege filesystem permissions
- Applying resource limits and malware or content scanning appropriate to the deployment
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in uploaded content and separating upload handling from executable application paths.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only narrowly defined file types based on validated content rather than client-provided names or MIME types
- Applying strict filename, size, extension, and content validation before storage
- Generating server-side filenames and ignoring attacker-controlled paths
- Storing uploads outside web-accessible and executable directories where feasible
- Enforcing authorization checks for upload operations and destination selection
- Serving uploaded content with restrictive response headers and least-privilege filesystem permissions
- Applying resource limits and malware or content scanning appropriate to the deployment
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis for direct use of file-movement APIs with request-controlled filenames, paths, or upload variables. Code review should examine extension and MIME validation, generated naming, destination canonicalization, authorization checks, and whether upload directories permit script execution.
Runtime monitoring can alert on unusual upload volume, executable extensions, unexpected content types, path traversal indicators, and newly created files under web-served directories. CI policy checks and automated security review tools can help identify upload handlers that lack allowlists or isolate files inadequately.
Detection can include static analysis for direct use of file-movement APIs with request-controlled filenames, paths, or upload variables. Code review should examine extension and MIME validation, generated naming, destination canonicalization, authorization checks, and whether upload directories permit script execution.
Runtime monitoring can alert on unusual upload volume, executable extensions, unexpected content types, path traversal indicators, and newly created files under web-served directories. CI policy checks and automated security review tools can help identify upload handlers that lack allowlists or isolate files inadequately.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
