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CVE-2026-75327

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Arbitrary File Upload (CWE-434) in DocSys uploadMarkdownPic

CVE-2026-75327

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Potential Remote Code Execution and Server Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DocSys V2.02.85 contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the

uploadMarkdownPic interface. If an attacker can reach this upload

endpoint, they may upload files that could be used to compromise the

application or its hosting environment, depending on storage and execution

controls.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the DocSys Markdown image upload workflow,

specifically the uploadMarkdownPic interface in

src/com/DocSystem/controller/DocController.java. Risk depends on whether

the endpoint is exposed to an attacker, whether authentication or

authorization controls are effective, and whether uploaded files are stored

in or served from locations where they can be interpreted as executable

content.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The DocSys uploadMarkdownPic HTTP interface
  • Required access: Network access to the endpoint, with authentication

requirements depending on deployment configuration

  • Trigger point: Submission of a file through the Markdown picture upload

workflow

  • Why exploitation is possible: The upload path may accept attacker-

controlled files without sufficiently restricting their type, name, size,

content, or destination

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an unrestricted file upload condition mapped to

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The application

appears to treat an uploaded file as a permitted image or document based on

insufficient trust in client-controlled metadata or content, without reliably

enforcing a safe allowlist and non-executable storage boundary. If dangerous

files are accepted and later processed or served from an executable context,

the upload capability can become a path to broader compromise.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
  • Uploaded content could be served to other users or used for phishing
  • The application or hosting environment could be compromised if uploaded

content is executable

  • Stored files could consume disk capacity or disrupt normal service
  • Sensitive information may be exposed through unsafe file handling

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in uploaded content and

separating user-controlled files from executable application resources.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing a narrow server-side allowlist of supported image formats
  • Validating file signatures and decoding content rather than trusting

extensions or client-provided MIME types

  • Generating server-side filenames and preventing path manipulation
  • Storing uploads outside executable or application code directories
  • Serving uploaded content with restrictive content types and download

semantics

  • Applying size, rate, quota, and authorization controls to uploads
  • Running file processing with least privilege and appropriate isolation

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis for upload handlers that trust filenames, extensions, MIME

headers, or user-controlled paths

  • Code review checks for missing content validation, filename generation, or

executable-directory separation

  • Web application testing that verifies rejected dangerous file types and

malformed content

  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected files, executable content, or abnormal

upload activity in application storage

  • Policy enforcement requiring approved upload libraries and server-side

content validation

Automated security review tools can help identify common file-upload handling

patterns, but should be complemented by deployment and runtime checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fangtang7/CVE/blob/main/DocSys/DocSys%E4%BB%BB%E6%84%8F%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6%E4%B8%8A%E4%BC%A0.md

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the upload interface is network-accessible

and an attacker can satisfy its authentication and authorization

requirements.

That depends on the application's access controls. The critical prerequisite

is the ability to submit files to uploadMarkdownPic; a publicly reachable

endpoint presents greater exposure.

Accept only required image formats after server-side content validation, assign

generated filenames, and store files outside executable application paths.

Treat all uploaded content as untrusted, enforce authorization and resource

limits, isolate file storage, and continuously monitor upload behavior and

stored-file locations.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.