Summary
Budibase account email-change endpoints may accept a client-supplied account identifier without verifying that it belongs to the authenticated session. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim's account identifier may redirect the victim's email to an attacker-controlled address and use the resulting password-reset flow to take over the account.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Budibase deployments using the affected account email change and verification workflow. Risk is present when the email-change endpoint trusts a client-provided accountId, checks only the current email, and does not consistently bind the requested account to the authenticated session.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Account email-change and verification API endpoints
- Required access: An authenticated Budibase account and knowledge of a victim account identifier
- Trigger point: Submission of an email-change request followed by verification and password-reset actions
- Why exploitation is possible: Server-side authorization does not adequately verify that the supplied accountId belongs to the authenticated requester
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an object-level authorization failure. The server accepts a client-controlled accountId and validates only limited account attributes, such as the current email, rather than deriving the target account from the authenticated session or enforcing ownership at every workflow step. This behavior maps to CWE-639 because an attacker may access or modify another user's account by manipulating an object identifier.
Potential impact
- An attacker may change a victim's account email address
- An attacker could complete a password-reset workflow for the victim
- A victim account may be taken over
- Account data and connected low-code applications may be exposed or altered
- Attackers may abuse the compromised account for further unauthorized actions
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization
throughout the complete email-change and recovery workflow.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target account from the authenticated session instead of trusting a client-supplied identifier
- Requiring explicit ownership authorization for every account-specific operation
- Binding verification tokens and workflow state to the initiating session, target account, and intended destination
- Invalidating prior recovery and email-change tokens when account state changes
- Applying least privilege to account-management operations and separating recovery privileges from ordinary user actions
- Avoiding disclosure of account identifiers and enforcing rate limits and anomaly checks on recovery endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and code review rules for direct use of request parameters in account lookups or updates
- Review of every endpoint that accepts accountId, userId, email, or other object identifiers
- Tests that attempt cross-account access with valid authenticated sessions
- Verification that recovery tokens are bound to the correct account, session, and workflow
- API gateway or authorization policies requiring consistent object-level authorization
- Logging and alerting for email changes, verification attempts, and password resets involving unusual account or session combinations
Automated security review tools may help flag missing authorization checks, but workflow-level testing remains important.

