Summary
Coze Studio contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in workflow handling that may allow authenticated users to access workflows belonging to other spaces. By presenting a workflow identifier outside their authorized tenant context, an attacker could read, execute, modify, or delete another space's workflow.
Coze Studio contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in workflow handling that may allow authenticated users to access workflows belonging to other spaces. By presenting a workflow identifier outside their authorized tenant context, an attacker could read, execute, modify, or delete another space's workflow.
Affected context
The issue may occur in Coze Studio deployments where workflow routes rely on a caller-supplied workflow identifier without consistently verifying that the referenced workflow belongs to the caller's space. Relevant operations include workflow saving, metadata updates, batch deletion, canvas access, test execution, and node debugging.
The issue may occur in Coze Studio deployments where workflow routes rely on a caller-supplied workflow identifier without consistently verifying that the referenced workflow belongs to the caller's space. Relevant operations include workflow saving, metadata updates, batch deletion, canvas access, test execution, and node debugging.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated workflow API routes
- Required access: A valid user account with access to the affected Coze Studio functionality
- Trigger point: Requests to workflow operations that accept a workflow identifier and space context
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks may validate the supplied space identifier without confirming ownership of the referenced workflow
- Attack surface: Authenticated workflow API routes
- Required access: A valid user account with access to the affected Coze Studio functionality
- Trigger point: Requests to workflow operations that accept a workflow identifier and space context
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks may validate the supplied space identifier without confirming ownership of the referenced workflow
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an object-level authorization failure. Workflow records are addressed through client-controlled identifiers, but the application may not enforce that each referenced workflow is owned by, or explicitly accessible to, the authenticated user's space.
This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, commonly associated with insecure direct object references. The insecure pattern occurs when an identifier is treated as sufficient authority to retrieve or mutate an object without a server-side ownership or permission check.
The underlying flaw is an object-level authorization failure. Workflow records are addressed through client-controlled identifiers, but the application may not enforce that each referenced workflow is owned by, or explicitly accessible to, the authenticated user's space.
This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, commonly associated with insecure direct object references. The insecure pattern occurs when an identifier is treated as sufficient authority to retrieve or mutate an object without a server-side ownership or permission check.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may read workflows from another space
- An attacker could execute or debug workflows outside their authorized tenant
- Unauthorized users may overwrite workflow definitions or metadata
- Workflows could be deleted through improperly authorized operations
- Sensitive business logic, connectors, or configuration details may be disclosed
- Cross-tenant integrity and isolation could be weakened
- An authenticated user may read workflows from another space
- An attacker could execute or debug workflows outside their authorized tenant
- Unauthorized users may overwrite workflow definitions or metadata
- Workflows could be deleted through improperly authorized operations
- Sensitive business logic, connectors, or configuration details may be disclosed
- Cross-tenant integrity and isolation could be weakened
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at every workflow operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve workflow objects through the authenticated user's authorized space rather than trusting a client-supplied tenant context
- Perform server-side ownership and permission checks before every read, execution, update, debug, or deletion action
- Centralize authorization logic so all workflow routes apply the same policy
- Use opaque, non-sequential identifiers as defense in depth, without treating them as an authorization control
- Apply least privilege to workflow actions and separate read, execute, update, and delete permissions
- Avoid exposing cross-tenant object metadata in error messages or response bodies
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at every workflow operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve workflow objects through the authenticated user's authorized space rather than trusting a client-supplied tenant context
- Perform server-side ownership and permission checks before every read, execution, update, debug, or deletion action
- Centralize authorization logic so all workflow routes apply the same policy
- Use opaque, non-sequential identifiers as defense in depth, without treating them as an authorization control
- Apply least privilege to workflow actions and separate read, execute, update, and delete permissions
- Avoid exposing cross-tenant object metadata in error messages or response bodies
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine static analysis, code review, and runtime authorization monitoring.
Useful approaches include:
- Reviewing handlers for direct database lookups based on request-supplied workflow IDs
- Checking whether every object lookup is constrained by the authenticated user's tenant or access-control scope
- Searching for workflow mutation and execution routes that lack shared authorization middleware
- Adding policy checks and tests for cross-space access attempts across read, write, execute, debug, and delete operations
- Monitoring authorization failures and unusual access to workflow identifiers across tenant boundaries
- Using automated security review tools to flag user-controlled identifiers used without ownership validation
Detection can combine static analysis, code review, and runtime authorization monitoring.
Useful approaches include:
- Reviewing handlers for direct database lookups based on request-supplied workflow IDs
- Checking whether every object lookup is constrained by the authenticated user's tenant or access-control scope
- Searching for workflow mutation and execution routes that lack shared authorization middleware
- Adding policy checks and tests for cross-space access attempts across read, write, execute, debug, and delete operations
- Monitoring authorization failures and unusual access to workflow identifiers across tenant boundaries
- Using automated security review tools to flag user-controlled identifiers used without ownership validation
