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CVE-2026-72746

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in FreeRDP RDSTLS Server

CVE-2026-72746

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Remote Session Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FreeRDP can incorrectly treat an unauthenticated RDSTLS session as authenticated when the server processes an unexpected handshake message without validating the required protocol state. An unauthenticated remote client may therefore gain access to an RDSTLS-protected session without presenting a password or validating other authentication material.

Affected context

The issue occurs in FreeRDP 3.x deployments where the server enables RDSTLS security through RdstlsSecurity = TRUE. Risk is present when the RDSTLS handshake accepts inbound protocol messages based on their declared type without confirming that each message is valid for the current authentication stage. The affected behavior is associated with the RDSTLS server-side handshake implementation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible FreeRDP server exposing an RDSTLS-protected service
  • Required access: Ability to establish an unauthenticated remote connection; valid credentials are not required
  • Trigger point: RDSTLS handshake processing before authentication completion
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server dispatches messages using attacker-controlled type information and can retain a zero-valued success result when an unexpected message does not explicitly update the authentication outcome

Why this happens

The vulnerability is caused by insufficient protocol-state validation during the RDSTLS handshake. The server accepts and processes a received message according to its wire-declared type without verifying that the message is the one required by the current handshake state. In addition, a success-valued default result can remain unchanged when a processing path does not explicitly assign an authentication failure. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the server can mark a session as authenticated without successfully evaluating the required authentication evidence.

Potential impact

  • An unauthenticated client may gain access to a protected remote session
  • The attacker could access resources exposed through the FreeRDP service
  • Session authorization boundaries may be bypassed
  • A compromised session could support further network or host-level activity, depending on account privileges

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication as a strict protocol-state transition rather than accepting success from message handling alone.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Validate that each received message is permitted in the current handshake state
  • Reject unexpected, duplicated, or out-of-order authentication messages
  • Initialize authentication outcomes to failure and require explicit success after all checks complete
  • Ensure password, redirection, and reconnect credentials are independently validated before session authorization
  • Run FreeRDP services with least-privilege accounts and restrict network exposure
  • Use compensating access controls such as network segmentation and authenticated gateways where practical

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis for protocol handlers that dispatch directly on untrusted message types
  • Review of state-machine transitions for missing expected-state checks
  • Checks for authentication results initialized to success or zero-valued success constants
  • Code review searches for paths that authorize sessions without explicit credential validation
  • Integration tests covering unexpected, reordered, repeated, and truncated handshake messages
  • Network monitoring for repeated failed or malformed RDSTLS negotiation attempts
  • Policy enforcement requiring authentication gates to complete before session resources are exposed

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/b05a9510787c83c87ffc5fa8d7cc9f06ed971695
github.comgithub.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/security/advisories/GHSA-rqgv-grx4-xm6x
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/freerdp-before-rdstls-server-authentication-bypass-via-pdu-type-confusion

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, the described condition can be triggered over the network against an exposed FreeRDP server with RDSTLS security enabled.

No. The key prerequisite is the ability to initiate an unauthenticated RDSTLS handshake with the affected server.

Require strict handshake-state validation and make authentication fail closed unless every required credential and protocol check explicitly succeeds.

Model authentication as a verifiable state machine, test unexpected message ordering, initialize outcomes to failure, and enforce that authorization cannot occur before authentication completion.

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