Summary
Attendize contains an insecure direct object reference in the attendee import endpoint. An authenticated event organiser may be able to import bulk attendee data into events owned by other accounts when the target event identifier is supplied without an ownership check.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Attendize deployments where authenticated event organisers can access the attendee import functionality and the endpoint accepts a target event identifier. Risk is present when event lookup is performed without confirming that the requested event belongs to the organiser's account or an otherwise authorized tenant.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated
postImportAttendeeattendee import endpoint - Required access: A valid authenticated event organiser account
- Trigger point: A bulk attendee import targeting an event identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint retrieves the target event without enforcing an ownership or tenant-boundary authorization check
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from treating a client-controlled object identifier as sufficient authorization to access a target event. The endpoint performs object lookup but does not verify that the resolved event is within the requesting organiser's permitted account or tenant scope. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, commonly known as an insecure direct object reference.
Potential impact
- An authenticated organiser may modify attendee data belonging to another account
- Cross-account event data may be polluted or corrupted
- Event owners may receive unauthorized or misleading attendee records
- Tenant isolation and trust between event organiser accounts could be weakened
- Downstream reporting, communications, or attendance workflows may be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the point where the target event is resolved and modified.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Scope event queries to the authenticated organiser, tenant, or authorization principal
- Perform an explicit ownership or permission check before processing imported data
- Prefer authorization-aware service methods over direct identifier-based lookups
- Avoid relying on client-supplied identifiers as proof of access
- Apply least-privilege permissions to event management operations
- Use consistent tenant-boundary enforcement across related import and update endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect IDOR risks through:
- Static analysis and code review rules identifying object lookups based directly on request parameters
- Review of controller and service methods for missing ownership, tenant, or permission checks
- Authorization tests that attempt to access objects belonging to a different account
- API policy enforcement requiring resource-scope validation before mutation operations
- Audit logging for cross-account object references and bulk modifications
Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify endpoints where authentication is present but object-level authorization is incomplete.

