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CVE-2026-70452

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Access Control Bypass (CWE-863) in rsync DNS Rules

CVE-2026-70452

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Access Control Bypass

CWE:

CWE-636, CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Restricted Files

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A DNS-failure handling flaw in rsync can cause hostname-based deny rules to be skipped instead of enforced. A remote attacker who can induce or influence DNS resolution failures may bypass module-level IP restrictions and access files in otherwise restricted module trees.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in rsync daemon deployments that use hostname-based hosts deny rules for module access control. It becomes risky when DNS resolution is unavailable, manipulated, or otherwise fails during rule evaluation, and the daemon treats the failed lookup as a reason to ignore the restriction rather than applying a secure default.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: rsync daemon module access over the network - Required access: Ability to connect to an exposed rsync service and cause

or influence DNS resolution failures for hostnames used in deny rules

  • Trigger point: Evaluation of hostname-based access controls during module

connection handling

  • Why exploitation is possible: A failed hostname lookup causes the

applicable deny rule to be skipped, allowing the request to proceed without

the intended restriction

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an insecure error-handling decision in access control evaluation. When a hostname-based deny rule cannot be resolved, the logic fails open by treating the rule as non-applicable instead of preserving the restrictive policy. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization, and is also related to CWE-636, Not Failing Securely, because an environmental lookup failure weakens authorization enforcement.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may access restricted rsync module file trees
  • Sensitive files or directory listings could be exposed
  • Unauthorized users could retrieve data protected by hostname-based rules
  • The incident could support further compromise if exposed files contain credentials or operational secrets

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on fail-closed authorization behavior and reducing reliance on fragile environmental lookups. Secure-by-default patterns include treating DNS failures as authorization failures, using validated IP-based or identity-based controls where practical, minimizing trust in attacker-influenced name resolution, and restricting rsync modules to the least data and privileges required. Network segmentation, narrow module exposure, and independent authentication or authorization layers can reduce impact when a name-resolution dependency is unavailable.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static and dynamic review of access-control code for branches that allow requests after DNS or policy lookup errors. Code reviews should examine hostname-based deny and allow rules, error-handling defaults, and whether authorization decisions remain restrictive when dependencies fail. Operational monitoring can alert on DNS failures coinciding with successful access to protected modules, unexpected clients, or unusual file enumeration. Policy enforcement may require fail-closed authorization patterns and tests covering resolver outages and malformed lookup results.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.5.0
github.comgithub.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-6692-28cx-wpqq
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/rsync-access-control-bypass-via-dns-resolution-failure

Frequently asked

questions

It can be remotely exploitable against an exposed rsync daemon when the

attacker can cause or influence DNS resolution failures affecting hostname-

based deny rules.

The key requirement is network reachability to the rsync service and the

ability to trigger the relevant resolution failure. Authentication

requirements depend on the daemon's separate module configuration.

Authorization should fail closed whenever hostname resolution or another

policy dependency fails. Access controls should also use narrowly scoped,

independently validated mechanisms where possible.

Test authorization behavior during DNS outages and lookup errors, review all

fail-open branches, minimize hostname-based trust decisions, and monitor

access to restricted modules for anomalous clients.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.