Summary
A logic flaw in Symfony's DefaultAuthenticationFailureHandler allows unauthenticated clients to dispatch subrequests to access_control-protected GET routes when failure_forward: true is enabled and _failure_path is supplied in the request.
Under these conditions, firewall listeners can be skipped, potentially exposing protected endpoints to users who have not successfully authenticated.
Affected context
This vulnerability arises in Symfony-based applications using the security component where:
- The
DefaultAuthenticationFailureHandleris in use failure_forward: trueis configured on the firewall- The application respects the request-supplied
_failure_pathparameter
In such setups, failed login attempts can be transformed into subrequests targeting GET routes that are normally protected by access_control, but which may be processed without the expected firewall listener checks.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Publicly exposed login or authentication endpoints in a Symfony application.
- Required access: Ability to issue HTTP requests to the affected application (no prior authentication is required).
- Trigger point: A failing authentication attempt where the attacker supplies a crafted
_failure_paththat points to a protected GET route. - Why exploitation is possible: The failure handler trusts the request-provided
_failure_pathand forwards the subrequest whilefailure_forward: trueis enabled, allowing the subrequest to bypass normal firewall listener execution and reach routes that should require authentication.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an access control misconfiguration pattern mapped to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Symfony's DefaultAuthenticationFailureHandler is honoring a user-controlled _failure_path parameter when forwarding on authentication failure, effectively allowing untrusted input to influence the internal routing of subrequests.
Because the forwarded subrequest can target access_control-protected GET routes without re-engaging the usual firewall listeners, the intended authorization checks are not consistently applied, resulting in a logic flaw where protected functionality becomes reachable to unauthenticated users.
Potential impact
- Unauthenticated users may access routes that were intended to be restricted to logged-in users.
- Sensitive information exposed via protected GET endpoints could be disclosed.
- Business logic tied to protected routes can be invoked without proper authentication.
- Application-level security assumptions around firewall and
access_controlenforcement can be undermined.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on reducing trust in request-controlled routing parameters and enforcing consistent authorization checks:
- Avoid honoring user-supplied path parameters (such as
_failure_path) for security-sensitive flows, or constrain them to a fixed, vetted set of destinations. - Ensure that failure handlers and other internal dispatch mechanisms always pass through the same firewall and
access_controlrules as direct requests. - Separate public and protected endpoints clearly and avoid reusing protected routes as failure or redirection targets.
- Design authentication workflows so that failure handling does not provide alternative, less-checked code paths into protected functionality.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically focuses on identifying inconsistent authorization flows and untrusted routing inputs:
- Use static analysis or code review to flag handlers that rely on request parameters (e.g.,
_failure_path) to determine internal routing or forwarding targets. - Review security configuration for
failure_forward: trueand confirm that forwarded requests still traverse firewall andaccess_controllogic. - Implement application-level tests that attempt to access protected routes via failed authentication flows and alternative dispatch paths.
- Employ automated configuration and code scanning tools that highlight discrepancies between declared access control rules and actual execution paths.

