/

CVE-2026-67678

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Unrestricted File Upload (CWE-434) in RainyGao DocSys v2.02.80

CVE-2026-67678

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical unrestricted file upload vulnerability in RainyGao-Hithub DocSys v2.02.80 may allow a remote attacker to upload files that the application later treats as executable code.

If the upload endpoint is reachable and lacks effective file-type, content, and storage controls, exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution on the affected server.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in DocSys file-upload functionality when remotely supplied files are accepted without sufficiently restricting their type, content, filename, or destination. Risk is higher when uploaded files are stored in a web-accessible or executable location and the application processes them with server-side privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A remotely reachable DocSys file-upload endpoint
  • Required access: The ability to submit files through the exposed upload workflow; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Server-side acceptance, storage, or subsequent processing of an uploaded file
  • Why exploitation is possible: File validation and storage controls may allow attacker-controlled content to reach a location or execution path where it can be interpreted as code

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an unrestricted file-upload design that does not reliably distinguish permitted data files from executable or otherwise dangerous content. This maps to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, where attacker-controlled files can be uploaded without adequate type validation, content verification, filename control, or safe storage isolation.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the affected server
  • Application data and configuration could be exposed or modified
  • The application could be used to access connected internal services
  • Server integrity and availability could be compromised
  • The vulnerability could enable persistence or follow-on attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making uploads data-only by default and reducing trust in all client-supplied file properties.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Allowlisting required file types based on verified content rather than client-provided extensions or MIME types
  • Rejecting executable formats and files containing active or server-interpreted content
  • Storing uploads outside web-accessible and executable directories
  • Generating server-controlled filenames and removing user-controlled path components
  • Applying size, quantity, and resource limits to upload requests
  • Scanning uploaded content where appropriate and validating it before downstream processing
  • Running the application with least-privilege filesystem and service permissions
  • Using isolated storage and separate processing boundaries for untrusted files

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis for upload handlers that trust extensions, MIME headers, filenames, or user-controlled paths
  • Code review checks for executable upload directories and direct file serving from application storage
  • Tests that verify rejected dangerous types, mismatched content signatures, path traversal indicators, and oversized files
  • Web application monitoring for anomalous upload volume, unusual extensions, unexpected content types, and execution attempts in upload paths
  • Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted upload types, non-executable storage, and least-privilege service accounts

Automated application-security review tools can help identify common unsafe upload patterns, but findings should be validated against deployment behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RainyGao-GitHub/DocSys/issues/49
github.comgithub.com/Y4y17/CVE/blob/main/DocSys/%E4%BB%BB%E6%84%8F%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6%E4%B8%8A%E4%BC%A0%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E.md

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an attacker can reach the vulnerable upload functionality and the application stores or processes uploaded content unsafely.

Not necessarily. The requirement depends on whether the upload endpoint is public, protected by authentication, or restricted by other access controls.

Treat uploads as untrusted data, allowlist only required content types, validate file content, store files outside executable and web-accessible paths, and enforce least privilege.

Combine secure upload design with code review, automated testing, monitoring, strict storage policies, and controls that prevent uploaded content from being interpreted as server-side code.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.