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CVE-2026-65388

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Open Redirect (CWE-601) in Containerization Registry Client

CVE-2026-65388

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Open Redirect

CWE:

CWE-601

Impact:

Credential Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity open redirect vulnerability in the containerization registry client may allow a registry controlled by an attacker to redirect a token request to an attacker-selected host. If a victim client follows that redirect, registry credentials or authorization tokens may be disclosed to the destination host.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur when the containerization client requests authentication tokens from a container registry and honors a redirect supplied through registry-controlled responses or metadata. Deployments are most exposed when clients communicate with registries that are not fully trusted or when redirect destinations are not restricted to approved authentication hosts.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Container registry authentication and token-request handling
  • Required access: Ability to operate or control a registry endpoint that a client will contact
  • Trigger point: Processing a registry-directed redirect during a token request
  • Why exploitation is possible: The client may accept an attacker-selected redirect destination without sufficiently restricting the target host, allowing credentials or tokens to be sent to that host

Why this happens

The underlying issue is insufficient validation of redirect destinations during registry authentication. A client that follows redirects for sensitive token requests without enforcing an allowlist or equivalent trust policy can be redirected across security boundaries. This behavior maps to CWE-601, where externally influenced redirect targets can send users or client requests to unintended locations.

Potential impact

  • Registry credentials or authorization tokens may be disclosed
  • An attacker could gain access to private images or registry operations
  • Compromised credentials could be reused against other systems
  • Client activity could be redirected to attacker-controlled infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating token-request redirects as

security-sensitive and reducing trust in registry-provided destinations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting redirects to explicitly approved registry and authentication hosts
  • Disabling cross-host redirects for credential-bearing requests
  • Avoiding transmission of credentials or tokens after an untrusted redirect
  • Separating registry discovery from authentication and validating each endpoint
  • Using narrowly scoped, short-lived tokens with least-privilege permissions
  • Applying secure-by-default transport and registry trust policies

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar issues through:

  • Static analysis for redirect-following logic in authentication and registry clients
  • Code review checks for credential-bearing requests that permit cross-host redirects
  • Tests that supply redirects to untrusted, alternate, or mismatched hosts
  • Runtime monitoring for token requests sent to destinations outside approved registry domains
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit host validation before forwarding authorization data

Automated security review tools may help detect unsafe redirect handling patterns during development.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apple/containerization/security/advisories/GHSA-mx96-5vvg-x2mg

Frequently asked

questions

Potentially. A remote attacker who controls a registry that the client contacts

may be able to influence the token-request destination without local access to

the victim system.

The attacker generally needs control of, or the ability to operate, a registry

endpoint that a client trusts or is directed to use. The client must also

perform an authentication token request against that endpoint.

Validate redirect destinations against an explicit trust policy and prevent

credentials or tokens from being sent to an unapproved host. Cross-host

redirects for sensitive requests should be rejected by default.

Treat registry authentication redirects as untrusted input, test alternate

and cross-origin destinations, enforce domain and scheme policies, and use

least-privilege credentials with limited scope and lifetime.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.