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CVE-2026-54072

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.3)

Open Redirect (CWE-601) in Authorizer /authorize Endpoint

CVE-2026-54072

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Open Redirect

CWE:

CWE-601

Impact:

Credential and Token Disclosure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Authorizer versions before 2.2.1 may accept attacker-controlled redirect URIs at the /authorize endpoint without checking them against configured allowed origins. For token-based response types, this can cause access tokens, identity tokens, and refresh tokens to be sent to an attacker-controlled destination, potentially enabling account or session compromise.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Authorizer deployments where the /authorize endpoint processes OAuth or OpenID Connect requests and does not validate the supplied redirect_uri against an approved origin list. It is especially risky when the endpoint supports response types that place tokens in redirect parameters and when an attacker can construct authorization requests using a valid public client identifier.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public /authorize endpoint
  • Required access: No authentication is generally required; a valid client identifier can be obtained from publicly exposed application metadata
  • Trigger point: Processing an authorization request with an attacker-controlled redirect_uri and a token-bearing response type
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may redirect to an untrusted destination while including authorization artifacts in the redirect parameters

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient validation of a security-sensitive redirect target. The /authorize handler accepts a caller-supplied redirect_uri without enforcing an allowlist or equivalent exact-match policy tied to the registered client. When token-bearing response types are used, redirecting to that untrusted location can disclose sensitive authorization material. This behavior maps to CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect').

Potential impact

  • An attacker could receive access tokens, identity tokens, or refresh tokens
  • User accounts or sessions may be compromised
  • Authorization responses could be redirected to phishing or credential-harvesting infrastructure
  • Confidentiality and integrity of protected resources may be affected
  • Applications relying on the authorization server could experience broader trust-boundary compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making redirect validation strict, centralized, and secure by default.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Permit only redirect URIs registered for the specific client
  • Prefer exact matching over loose prefix, substring, wildcard, or pattern matching
  • Validate scheme, host, port, path, and encoding consistently before issuing any redirect
  • Reject unrecognized or malformed redirect targets rather than falling back to user-supplied values
  • Avoid placing bearer tokens in URLs where safer authorization-code flows are available
  • Minimize token scope, lifetime, and privileges, and use sender-constrained or otherwise protected tokens where feasible
  • Apply the same validation policy across every authorization and account-action handler
  • Protect client metadata and prevent unauthorized changes to registered redirect URIs

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this vulnerability class through:

  • Static analysis rules that identify redirects based directly on request parameters
  • Code review checks for missing allowlist validation around redirect_uri
  • Tests covering unregistered hosts, subdomains, alternate ports, encoded URLs, and unexpected schemes
  • Dynamic testing that verifies token-bearing responses never reach unapproved origins
  • Policy enforcement requiring exact redirect-URI registration for every OAuth or OpenID Connect client
  • Monitoring for authorization requests and redirects to domains outside the approved application inventory

Automated security review tools may help identify untrusted redirect flows, but endpoint-specific tests are useful for confirming token disclosure risks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/security/advisories/GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The affected authorization endpoint is typically publicly reachable, and exploitation may not require an authenticated account. The attacker still needs to cause a victim or authorization flow to use a crafted request.

The attacker generally needs no privileged access. A valid public client identifier may be sufficient to construct an authorization request, depending on deployment configuration.

Validate every redirect_uri against the exact set of URIs registered for the requesting client before issuing a redirect. Unrecognized destinations should be rejected, and safer authorization-code flows should be preferred over token-bearing redirects.

Centralize redirect validation, enforce strict client registration policies, test unusual URL forms, minimize token exposure in URLs, and monitor redirects to domains outside the approved application inventory.

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