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CVE-2026-59955

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Auth Bypass (CWE-287) in Apollo ConfigService Raw APIs

CVE-2026-59955

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Configuration Data Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Apollo ConfigService's raw configuration endpoint misparses certain requests when AccessKey or management key authentication is enabled, causing authentication to be evaluated against a wrong application identifier.

An attacker who can reach the ConfigService HTTP interface may be able to bypass signature checks for specific paths and retrieve raw configuration data for target applications without proper authorization.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Apollo deployments using ConfigService with AccessKey or management key–based authentication enabled, particularly where the /configfiles/raw/{appId}/{clusterName}/{namespace} API is exposed within the infrastructure.

It manifests when request routing and authentication logic interpret the path segment raw as the appId used for AccessKey lookup instead of the actual application identifier in the URL.

Environments that rely on Apollo for sensitive microservice configuration—such as secrets, tokens, or environment-specific parameters—are at heightened risk if network-level access to ConfigService is not strictly controlled.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) API endpoints exposed by Apollo ConfigService, specifically paths under /configfiles/raw/{appId}/{clusterName}/{namespace}.
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the ConfigService instance (e.g., from within the cluster, service mesh, or any reachable network segment).
  • Authentication state: AccessKey or management key authentication is enabled, but the affected endpoint misbinds the appId used for verification.
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted requests to the raw configuration endpoint such that the service performs AccessKey lookup for raw instead of the intended target appId, potentially skipping signature verification for the target application.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Input from the URL path is not validated or normalized correctly, leading to incorrect association between the request and its authentication context, which maps to improper input validation (CWE-20) and improper authentication (CWE-287).

Why this happens

The root cause lies in flawed request parsing and authentication binding logic for the raw configuration API.

When processing /configfiles/raw/{appId}/{clusterName}/{namespace}, the service incorrectly treats raw as the appId used for AccessKey lookup instead of using the actual appId path segment.

Because the authentication decision is now bound to a non-existent or unrelated identity, ConfigService may proceed without proper signature verification for the intended target application.

This pattern reflects CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), where path components are not correctly interpreted, combined with CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), where the authentication mechanism is applied to the wrong principal, effectively creating an authentication bypass for configuration retrieval.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may retrieve raw configuration data for applications without valid AccessKeys or management keys.
  • Sensitive information such as database credentials, API keys, tokens, or internal endpoints may be exposed.
  • Compromised configuration data can facilitate lateral movement and further compromise of backend services.
  • Configuration-based security controls (e.g., feature flags, IP allowlists, or rate limits managed via config) can be analyzed and potentially bypassed.
  • Disclosure of environment-specific parameters may aid in targeted exploitation of other weaknesses in the environment.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening authentication flows and strictly binding requests to the correct application identity.

Pattern-oriented measures include:

  • Ensuring that authentication and authorization are based on a canonical representation of the request target (e.g., normalized appId) rather than ambiguous path segments or prefixes.
  • Validating and sanitizing URL path components so that routing helpers cannot reinterpret reserved tokens (such as raw) as application identifiers.
  • Applying a consistent authentication layer in front of all configuration APIs, including specialized endpoints like "raw" views, to prevent unguarded code paths.
  • Reducing trust in configuration management endpoints by segregating them onto dedicated, restricted network segments and applying zero-trust-style access controls.
  • Storing highly sensitive secrets in dedicated secret-management services, limiting the sensitivity of data exposed through configuration APIs.

These mitigation patterns help ensure that even if parsing quirks arise, they do not translate directly into unauthenticated data access.

How teams detect issues like this

Detecting this class of issue typically involves a combination of design review, code analysis, and runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review: Examine request handlers for inconsistent use of path parameters in authentication logic; ensure the appId used for AccessKey lookup always matches the appId used for data retrieval.
  • Authentication flow review: Map all endpoints, including specialized ones like /configfiles/raw/..., to a single, centralized authentication and authorization mechanism; flag any endpoints implementing bespoke or shortcut logic.
  • Security testing: Use automated API scanners or integration tests to probe configuration endpoints for responses without valid signatures or AccessKeys, especially when manipulating path segments.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable detailed audit logs for ConfigService calls, including request paths, resolved appId identities, and authentication results; alert on suspicious patterns such as frequent access to raw endpoints or successful responses without corresponding valid credentials.
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce CI/CD checks that enforce explicit authentication annotations or middleware for all new HTTP handlers touching configuration data.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apolloconfig/apollo/commit/310809d557e01c6803051736cd525e333ffe00ec
github.comgithub.com/apolloconfig/apollo/releases/tag/v2.5.2
github.comgithub.com/apolloconfig/apollo/security/advisories/GHSA-h4pc-58cc-hc95

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how widely Apollo ConfigService is exposed within your environment.

If ConfigService endpoints are reachable from untrusted or semi-trusted network zones, an attacker may leverage the flawed parsing logic to query raw configuration without valid credentials.

In many scenarios, the attacker does not need valid keys for the target application.

The bug stems from the service misbinding the authentication context, so certain requests can succeed even when the caller lacks the proper AccessKey for the appId whose configuration is being read.

The safest fix is to centralize and strictly enforce authentication based on the actual target identity.

All endpoints, including raw configuration views, should derive the appId from a canonical, validated source and must perform signature verification and authorization checks consistently before any configuration data is returned.

Prevention involves designing APIs with clear, unambiguous authentication boundaries and validating all externally controlled input used in routing or identity resolution.

Practices such as enforcing a uniform authentication middleware, performing threat modeling for administrative and configuration endpoints, and adding automated tests for negative authentication cases on every new endpoint can significantly reduce the likelihood of similar issues.

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