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CVE-2026-55676

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Unrestricted Upload (CWE-434) in Malcolm File Upload

CVE-2026-55676

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Authenticated Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Malcolm's file-upload component accepts files without enforcing an effective extension allow-list, allowing an authenticated upload-capable user to submit PHP code. Because uploaded files are stored in a web-served directory and PHP requests are forwarded to php-fpm, the code may execute as the web-service account when requested.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Malcolm deployments using the FilePond PHP upload backend with the associated nginx and php-fpm configuration. Risk is present when the upload allow-list is empty or otherwise ineffective, uploaded files retain executable extensions, and the storage directory is both web-accessible and configured to process PHP files. In RBAC mode, access may be available to users assigned the granular upload-only role.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The authenticated file-upload endpoint at /server/php/submit.php
  • Required access: A valid account with the upload-capable permission, such as the granular upload role in affected RBAC configurations
  • Trigger point: A subsequent authenticated request for an uploaded file under the web-served files directory
  • Why exploitation is possible: The default type restriction does not reject PHP extensions, the filename handling preserves the extension, and nginx routes matching PHP files to php-fpm

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an unrestricted file-upload condition mapped to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The component treats an empty extension allow-list as if it were a restrictive policy, allowing executable server-side files to be stored in a directory that is directly served by the same application stack. This combines insufficient content and filename validation with an unsafe storage and execution boundary.

Potential impact

  • An authenticated upload-authorized user may execute arbitrary PHP code as www-data
  • The file-upload container could be compromised
  • Application data or captured network artifacts could be accessed or altered
  • The attacker could use the compromised container to attempt credential access or lateral movement
  • Service integrity and availability could be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on separating uploaded content from executable application content and enforcing a deny-by-default upload policy.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Store uploads outside web roots or on a separate non-executable service
  • Enforce a non-empty, explicit allow-list of permitted types and extensions
  • Validate file content using trusted server-side inspection rather than relying only on client metadata
  • Generate server-side filenames and remove executable extensions from stored objects
  • Configure web servers to serve uploaded content as inert data and never pass the upload directory to PHP handlers
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to the upload process and container
  • Require authorization checks that match the sensitivity of the upload operation

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis for empty or optional upload allow-lists and extension checks based only on user-controlled filenames
  • Code review of upload paths, filename normalization, storage locations, and web-server handler mappings
  • Configuration policy checks ensuring upload directories are outside executable document roots
  • Runtime monitoring for PHP or other server-side script files appearing in upload directories
  • Web and application logs correlating upload requests with later requests for uploaded files
  • Automated security review tools that flag unrestricted uploads and executable content handling

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-230-01.json
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/Malcolm/releases/tag/v26.06.1
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/Malcolm/security/advisories/GHSA-8cvp-m7pg-qrp7
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-230-01

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, within the application's authenticated attack surface. An attacker still needs network access to the upload endpoint and a permitted upload role.

No. In affected RBAC deployments, the granular upload-only role may be sufficient because it can reach the upload endpoint.

Store uploads outside executable web roots, enforce a strict non-empty allow-list, and configure the web server to treat uploaded content as inert data.

Review upload authorization separately from file execution controls, validate content and names server-side, monitor upload directories, and enforce secure web-server policies through code and deployment checks.

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