Summary
Incus contains an authorization flaw in instance-copy operations that may let an attacker copy an instance from a project they cannot access into a project they can access. If the attacker knows the source project and instance names, this could expose secrets and other sensitive data stored in the instance.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Incus deployments using instance-copy functionality before the affected authorization checks are present. Risk depends on project isolation, the attacker's ability to invoke copy operations, and whether source project and instance names can be discovered or otherwise obtained.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Incus instance-copy functionality
- Required access: An Incus identity or client context able to perform copy operations, but not authorized to access the source project
- Required knowledge: The name of the restricted source project and an instance within it
- Trigger point: A copy request referencing the unauthorized source instance
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization is not adequately verified before the instance is copied to a destination project
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an incomplete authorization decision in a cross-project resource operation. The copy path permits an instance reference to be processed without consistently confirming that the requester has permission to read or copy the source resource. This behavior maps to CWE-284, Improper Access Control, because access restrictions are not effectively enforced at the operation boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain unauthorized instance data
- Secrets, credentials, or configuration values may be disclosed
- A copied instance could enable further access to connected services
- Project and tenant isolation could be weakened
- Organizations could experience confidentiality and compliance impacts
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every resource
operation and preserving project isolation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require an explicit permission check on the source project and instance before copying
- Apply deny-by-default authorization for cross-project operations
- Ensure destination-project permissions do not substitute for source-resource permissions
- Limit instance metadata and names exposed to unauthorized users
- Run instances and management identities with least privilege
- Audit and alert on cross-project copy requests, especially failed or unusual attempts
- Use security tests that verify authorization across project boundaries
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static and policy analysis of copy, clone, import, and migration handlers
- Code review checks confirming source-resource authorization before data movement
- Integration tests using identities with access to a destination project but not the source
- API policy checks that require explicit source and destination authorization
- Audit-log monitoring for unexpected cross-project instance copies
- Automated security review tools that model authorization decisions across resource boundaries

