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CVE-2026-54547

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in Meta Ads MCP Server

CVE-2026-54547

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized access and modification of Meta Ads data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Meta Ads MCP versions before 1.0.115 can accept an arbitrary X-Pipeboard-Token value over the streamable HTTP transport without establishing an authenticated context. The server may then fall back to the operator's META_ACCESS_TOKEN, allowing an unauthorized network caller to use MCP tools with the operator's Meta Ads privileges.

Affected context

The issue occurs in deployments that expose Meta Ads MCP through the streamable HTTP transport and configure META_ACCESS_TOKEN. It depends on request handling in AuthInjectionMiddleware and token extraction logic failing to treat X-Pipeboard-Token as a primary credential. Deployments using the default stdio transport or lacking META_ACCESS_TOKEN are generally outside the described exposure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible streamable HTTP MCP endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP MCP requests to the exposed server
  • Credential requirement: No valid operator credential is required; an arbitrary X-Pipeboard-Token value may be sufficient
  • Trigger point: Authentication middleware processing an HTTP MCP request
  • Why exploitation is possible: The request can pass the authentication guard without creating an authentication context, after which token resolution falls back to the server operator's META_ACCESS_TOKEN

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authentication-state validation failure mapped to CWE-287, Improper Authentication. The middleware checks whether both expected token variables are absent, while the header extraction logic does not recognize X-Pipeboard-Token as a primary credential. This inconsistent handling allows a request containing an unrecognized token header to bypass the intended authentication requirement and inherit a privileged fallback credential.

Potential impact

  • An unauthorized caller may read the operator's Meta Ads data.
  • An attacker could create, modify, or delete advertising resources through exposed MCP tools.
  • Campaign settings, budgets, audiences, or other account data could be altered.
  • The operator's Meta access token could effectively be abused through the server's tool interface.
  • Business, financial, or advertising-related information may be disclosed or manipulated.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authentication explicit and preventing

privileged credential fallback for unauthenticated requests.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Treating every supported credential header consistently during authentication.
  • Rejecting requests unless a valid, authorized authentication context is established.
  • Ensuring missing, malformed, or unrecognized credentials cannot trigger operator-token fallback.
  • Restricting streamable HTTP exposure to trusted networks and authenticated callers.
  • Running the MCP server with the least privilege required for its Meta Ads tasks.
  • Avoiding shared operator credentials where scoped, short-lived, or delegated credentials are available.
  • Keeping administrative secrets out of execution paths that can be reached before authentication completes.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine application, network, and source-level review:

  • Monitor HTTP MCP requests for arbitrary or repeated X-Pipeboard-Token values that do not correspond to recognized credentials.
  • Alert when Meta Ads actions are performed without a clearly recorded authenticated principal.
  • Review logs for requests that reach tool execution while authentication context fields are empty or unresolved.
  • Use static analysis and code review rules to compare accepted credential headers with authentication guard conditions.
  • Flag fallback logic that supplies privileged tokens when request authentication fails or is absent.
  • Enforce deployment policies that prevent unauthenticated network exposure of streamable HTTP MCP services.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pipeboard-co/meta-ads-mcp/commit/95e852793b7ff8604a8132e85d5facd08c91a36e
github.comgithub.com/pipeboard-co/meta-ads-mcp/pull/137
github.comgithub.com/pipeboard-co/meta-ads-mcp/releases/tag/1.0.115
github.comgithub.com/pipeboard-co/meta-ads-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-2v2f-mvfg-ph56

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the streamable HTTP transport is network

accessible and the server has META_ACCESS_TOKEN configured. The default stdio

transport is not exposed in the same way.

Not necessarily. The described behavior allows an arbitrary X-Pipeboard-Token

value to pass the middleware guard, after which the server may use its

configured operator token.

Require successful authentication before tool execution and ensure every

credential source is consistently recognized, validated, and associated with

an explicit authorization context. Privileged fallback credentials should

never be used for unauthenticated requests.

Test authentication failure paths, audit header and token handling for

inconsistencies, log the authenticated principal for each privileged action,

restrict network exposure, and apply least privilege to Meta Ads tokens.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.