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CVE-2026-53863

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Insecure Direct Object Reference (CWE-639) in OpenClaw

CVE-2026-53863

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Direct Object Reference

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Access Control Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw before 2026.4.25 contains an input validation flaw where tool group policy callers accept unvalidated group IDs.

An attacker who can supply arbitrary group IDs to the policy resolver may cause incorrect policy decisions for tool invocations, potentially bypassing intended access controls.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in OpenClaw deployments that rely on group-based policies to govern tool invocations.

It specifically affects code paths where callers pass group identifiers into the policy resolver and those identifiers are trusted without verification against the authenticated user's actual group memberships or an authoritative directory.

The issue is most relevant in environments where untrusted or user-controlled inputs can influence group IDs used for access control decisions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Any interface, API, or internal integration that allows a user or external system to influence the group ID passed into the tool group policy resolver.
  • Required access: Ability to authenticate or otherwise interact with OpenClaw in a manner that lets the attacker control or tamper with the group ID used in policy evaluation.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted or unauthorized group ID when invoking tools or requesting policy decisions, causing the resolver to evaluate permissions under that group.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The policy resolver trusts the supplied group ID as if it were authoritative, rather than enforcing a binding between the authenticated principal and allowed group memberships, resulting in an insecure direct object reference to group-based permissions.

Why this happens

The core issue is a broken access control pattern where authorization logic depends on a group identifier provided by the caller without validating that it belongs to the authenticated user or a permitted context.

Instead of deriving group membership from a trusted source (such as a session, token claims, or a directory lookup), the implementation accepts arbitrary group IDs and uses them directly to resolve policy decisions.

This maps to CWE-639: Insecure Direct Object Reference, in which internal authorization-relevant identifiers are exposed to and controlled by users, allowing them to reference objects or privilege contexts they should not be able to access.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could cause tools to run under more privileged group policies than intended.
  • Sensitive operations or administrative tools could be invoked by users who should not have access.
  • Data or functions restricted to specific groups could be accessed or manipulated using spoofed group IDs.
  • Logging and audit trails may misleadingly attribute actions to incorrect groups, complicating incident response.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation should focus on separating identity from caller-controlled identifiers and enforcing strict server-side authorization checks.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving group membership exclusively from trusted identity sources (e.g., session state, tokens, or directory lookups) instead of request parameters.
  • Validating any group reference against the authenticated user's allowed group memberships before performing policy resolution.
  • Introducing a clear authorization layer that maps users to groups using server-side logic, disallowing arbitrary group ID selection by clients.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to group policies so that the impact of any misbinding is minimized.
  • Centralizing access control logic to avoid ad hoc checks scattered across different tool invocation paths.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on identifying insecure patterns where authorization relies on user-supplied identifiers.

Possible approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag uses of group IDs or similar authorization keys when sourced directly from request parameters, query strings, headers, or untrusted inputs.
  • Code review checklists that explicitly ask whether group or role identifiers are derived from the authenticated context or from caller-controlled data.
  • Instrumentation and logging that record discrepancies between authenticated principals and the group IDs used in policy resolution, enabling anomaly detection.
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD that rejects code introducing new authorization decisions based on unvalidated external identifiers, optionally supported by automated review tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-985f-72mj-8gf7
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unvalidated-group-id-acceptance-in-tool-group-policy

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if an external interface or API allows remote users or systems to influence the group ID used by the policy resolver, the issue can be exploited over the network.

The attacker typically needs the ability to interact with OpenClaw in a way that lets them supply or tamper with group IDs, which may require basic authentication but not elevated privileges.

Ensure group IDs used in policy decisions are derived from trusted, server-side identity information (such as authenticated user context or directory lookups), and validate that any referenced group belongs to the current principal before evaluating policies.

Design authorization logic so that clients never control internal identifiers tied to permissions, adopt centralized access control services, and enforce secure coding practices and automated checks to detect IDOR-like patterns during development.

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