Summary
Grashjs Atlas CMMS contains a broken object-level authorization flaw in the company API. An authenticated user may read or modify another tenant's company profile by changing the numeric object identifier when tenant ownership checks are not enforced.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in multi-tenant Grashjs Atlas CMMS deployments where authenticated users can access the company object endpoint and object identifiers are accepted without a corresponding tenant-bound authorization decision. The risk is greatest when company records contain tenant profile information or can be updated through the same API.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated
/company/{id}API endpoint - Required access: A valid authenticated account in one tenant
- Trigger point: A read or update request targeting a company object identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization is evaluated for object access without reliably verifying that the requested company belongs to the user's tenant
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level access control failure. The application uses a client-supplied numeric identifier to locate a company record but does not consistently bind that lookup and subsequent update operation to the authenticated user's tenant. This behavior maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because the system fails to enforce the authorization boundary required to protect objects across tenants.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may read another tenant's company profile data
- An attacker could modify company records outside their authorized tenant
- Cross-tenant confidentiality and integrity could be compromised
- Unauthorized changes may disrupt tenant administration or business workflows
- Exposed profile information could support further targeted attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the object and tenant boundaries rather than trusting identifiers supplied by clients.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the tenant context from the authenticated session or token
- Applying tenant ownership predicates to every company read and update query
- Performing centralized, deny-by-default object authorization checks
- Avoiding reliance on numeric identifiers as authorization decisions
- Limiting service-account and application privileges using least privilege
- Returning uniform responses for unauthorized and nonexistent objects where appropriate
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect similar authorization weaknesses through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for direct object lookups using request parameters
- Review of API handlers and database queries for missing tenant or ownership predicates
- Authorization tests that attempt access to objects belonging to different tenants
- Runtime monitoring for repeated requests involving sequential or out-of-scope object identifiers
- API gateway and service policies requiring tenant context on protected resource operations
- Automated security testing tools that exercise horizontal privilege boundaries

