Summary
IXP Manager contains an authorization flaw in the API-key management path that can allow an authenticated user to view or modify another user's API-key record. The issue becomes risky when object identifiers are accepted without verifying that the requested resource belongs to the caller.
IXP Manager contains an authorization flaw in the API-key management path that can allow an authenticated user to view or modify another user's API-key record. The issue becomes risky when object identifiers are accepted without verifying that the requested resource belongs to the caller.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in IXP Manager's API-key view and edit/update functionality when the application retrieves a record by identifier without consistently enforcing ownership. Deployments are exposed when authenticated users can submit identifiers for resources outside their authorized scope and server-side authorization does not compare the resource owner with the requesting user.
The vulnerability occurs in IXP Manager's API-key view and edit/update functionality when the application retrieves a record by identifier without consistently enforcing ownership. Deployments are exposed when authenticated users can submit identifiers for resources outside their authorized scope and server-side authorization does not compare the resource owner with the requesting user.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated API-key management endpoints
- Required access: A valid user account or session
- Trigger point: Viewing or updating an API-key record through the relevant API path
- Why exploitation is possible: The record lookup uses a supplied identifier without reliably confirming that its
user_idmatches the caller
- Attack surface: Authenticated API-key management endpoints
- Required access: A valid user account or session
- Trigger point: Viewing or updating an API-key record through the relevant API path
- Why exploitation is possible: The record lookup uses a supplied identifier without reliably confirming that its
user_idmatches the caller
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The controller identifies an API-key record by a client-influenced identifier but does not enforce an ownership or permission check before returning or modifying it. This maps primarily to CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, and is also consistent with CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization.
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The controller identifies an API-key record by a client-influenced identifier but does not enforce an ownership or permission check before returning or modifying it. This maps primarily to CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, and is also consistent with CWE-863, Incorrect Authorization.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may view another user's API-key record
- An authenticated user could modify or disrupt another user's API-key configuration
- Exposed API-key information may enable unauthorized access to connected services
- Attackers could weaken account integrations or cause service disruption
- An authenticated user may view another user's API-key record
- An authenticated user could modify or disrupt another user's API-key configuration
- Exposed API-key information may enable unauthorized access to connected services
- Attackers could weaken account integrations or cause service disruption
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization for every object access,
not only on the endpoint or user interface.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Scope database queries to the authenticated user's authorized ownership or tenant context
- Perform server-side authorization checks before both reads and updates
- Avoid treating client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Use centralized, deny-by-default authorization policies
- Minimize API-key visibility and apply least privilege to related credentials
- Return consistent authorization failures without revealing whether another user's object exists
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization for every object access,
not only on the endpoint or user interface.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Scope database queries to the authenticated user's authorized ownership or tenant context
- Perform server-side authorization checks before both reads and updates
- Avoid treating client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Use centralized, deny-by-default authorization policies
- Minimize API-key visibility and apply least privilege to related credentials
- Return consistent authorization failures without revealing whether another user's object exists
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag object lookups by request-supplied identifiers without ownership checks
- Review of controller and repository methods for missing user, tenant, or role predicates
- Authorization tests that attempt cross-user reads and updates using valid authenticated sessions
- API policy checks requiring resource-level authorization on every read and write operation
- Automated security testing tools that exercise object identifiers across multiple user contexts
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag object lookups by request-supplied identifiers without ownership checks
- Review of controller and repository methods for missing user, tenant, or role predicates
- Authorization tests that attempt cross-user reads and updates using valid authenticated sessions
- API policy checks requiring resource-level authorization on every read and write operation
- Automated security testing tools that exercise object identifiers across multiple user contexts
