/

CVE-2026-51766

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Improper Access Control (CWE-284) in TOTOLINK T6 Router

CVE-2026-51766

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Device Reboot and Mesh-Wide Availability Disruption

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

TOTOLINK T6 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 contains incorrect access control in the setDevReboot function. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the device's MQTT broker may trigger a local reboot and, when targeting a mesh master, cause reboot commands to be forwarded to mesh slave devices.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TOTOLINK T6 deployments using the affected firmware and the cs_broker MQTT component. Risk is higher when the broker or related management interface is reachable by untrusted network clients and when the device operates as a mesh master capable of forwarding reboot requests to slave devices.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The device's MQTT service and associated setDevReboot command path
  • Required access: Network reachability to the relevant broker or service; authentication may not be required
  • Trigger point: Processing of a reboot-related MQTT message by setDevReboot
  • Why exploitation is possible: The function does not adequately enforce authorization before accepting a reboot request or forwarding it to mesh devices

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization failure in a privileged device-control function. A reboot operation is exposed through a message-driven interface without reliably verifying that the requester is authenticated and authorized to perform the action. This maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because access restrictions for a security-sensitive operation are missing or insufficient.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may reboot the targeted router without authorization
  • Network connectivity and dependent services could be temporarily disrupted
  • A compromised or exposed mesh master could cause reboot requests to affect mesh slave devices
  • Repeated abuse could contribute to denial-of-service conditions
  • Administrative and operational recovery effort could increase

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every privileged control boundary and reducing exposure of device-management services.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require strong authentication and explicit authorization for reboot operations
  • Restrict MQTT broker access to trusted management networks and clients
  • Validate message origin, device role, and command scope before forwarding requests
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to management services and mesh-control channels
  • Use network segmentation and deny-by-default firewall policies for administrative interfaces
  • Add rate limits and operational safeguards for repeated reboot requests
  • Prefer secure-by-default management configurations that do not expose control services to untrusted networks

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules requiring authorization checks before device-control operations
  • Review of MQTT handlers for unauthenticated commands that invoke reboot, reset, or configuration functions
  • Testing that management actions are denied for unauthenticated and unauthorized clients
  • Broker and router telemetry searches for unexpected reboot messages or repeated restart events
  • Policy enforcement restricting management protocols and privileged topics to approved identities and networks
  • Automated security testing that verifies authorization consistently across direct and mesh-forwarded command paths

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
github.comgithub.com/ShengWu00/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
totolink.nettotolink.net/
totolink.nettotolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable from a network position that can reach the relevant MQTT broker or service. Exploitability depends on deployment exposure and network controls.

The described issue allows unauthenticated attackers to submit the triggering request, although network reachability to the affected service is still required.

Enforce authentication and authorization before processing reboot commands, and restrict MQTT management traffic to trusted clients and networks.

Treat every device-control message as untrusted, apply centralized authorization checks, test both direct and forwarded command paths, and monitor for anomalous management activity.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.