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CVE-2026-51765

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Access Control (CWE-284) in TOTOLINK T6 cs_broker

CVE-2026-51765

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Mesh Topology Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

TOTOLINK T6 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the

recvIndirectMeshInfo function. An unauthenticated attacker may send a

crafted MQTT message to the cs_broker component to insert or replace mesh

neighbor records.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TOTOLINK T6 firmware version 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015

when the cs_broker component processes mesh information through the

recvIndirectMeshInfo function. Risk is present where MQTT messages can reach

this processing path without authentication or adequate authorization checks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MQTT message handling in the cs_broker component
  • Required access: Network reachability to the relevant MQTT service; valid authentication may not be required
  • Trigger point: Processing of mesh neighbor information by recvIndirectMeshInfo
  • Why exploitation is possible: The function does not sufficiently verify whether the sender is authorized to insert or replace mesh neighbor records

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a function that accepts

security-sensitive mesh topology data. The component permits an unauthenticated

message source to modify neighbor records without reliably validating

identity, privilege, or message provenance. This behavior maps to

CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where access to a protected operation is

not adequately enforced.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may insert or replace mesh neighbor records.
  • Mesh topology information may be manipulated or corrupted.
  • Network traffic could be misdirected or connectivity could be disrupted.
  • Router availability or mesh stability could be reduced.
  • The altered topology could support further unauthorized activity within the network.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the point where

mesh records are created or replaced. Common defensive patterns include:

  • Requiring authenticated and authorized message sources for topology updates.
  • Validating message provenance, integrity, freshness, and expected device identity.
  • Applying allowlists for permitted mesh peers and rejecting unknown records.
  • Separating read-only mesh information from privileged topology-management operations.
  • Running broker and mesh-management components with only the privileges they require.
  • Restricting MQTT exposure through network segmentation and deny-by-default access policies.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis and code review for MQTT handlers that modify persistent or

security-sensitive records without explicit authorization checks.

  • Searching for mesh update functions that trust sender-provided device

identifiers, neighbor data, or replacement commands.

  • Monitoring broker logs for unauthenticated topology-update messages and

unexpected changes to mesh neighbor records.

  • Enforcing policies that require authentication, integrity validation, and

peer authorization for privileged MQTT topics.

  • Using automated security review tools to flag missing access-control checks

around message-driven state changes.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
github.comgithub.com/ShengWu00/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
totolink.nettotolink.net/
totolink.nettotolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable over the network when the MQTT service or its message

handling path is reachable by an unauthenticated attacker.

Not necessarily. The vulnerability description indicates that authentication

is not required when a crafted MQTT message reaches the affected function.

Require authenticated, authorized, and integrity-protected mesh update messages

before allowing neighbor records to be inserted or replaced.

Treat topology changes as privileged operations, validate peer identity and

message provenance, restrict broker exposure, and monitor for unauthorized

state changes.

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