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CVE-2026-51754

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Access Control (CWE-284) in TOTOLINK T6 MQTT

CVE-2026-51754

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Modification of Network Device State

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical access-control vulnerability in the TOTOLINK T6 allows unauthenticated attackers to alter the slave IP inventory state through the MQTT broker component. The issue becomes risky when the device accepts crafted MQTT messages without verifying that the sender is authorized to invoke the updateSlaveIpList function.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TOTOLINK T6 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 deployments where the cs_broker component exposes a message path that reaches the updateSlaveIpList function. Risk depends on MQTT exposure, broker access controls, and whether the device trusts incoming messages without sufficient authentication or authorization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MQTT message handling through the device's cs_broker component
  • Required access: No authenticated account is required when the relevant MQTT endpoint is reachable
  • Trigger point: Processing of a crafted message that invokes updateSlaveIpList
  • Why exploitation is possible: The update operation does not adequately verify whether the message sender is authorized to change the slave IP inventory state

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a state-changing function. The device accepts input that can reach updateSlaveIpList but does not enforce an appropriate access-control decision before modifying inventory data. This maps to CWE-284, Improper Access Control, where a protected operation or resource is insufficiently restricted to authorized subjects.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may overwrite the device's slave IP inventory state
  • Network management behavior could become inconsistent or unreliable
  • Monitoring, routing, or device-discovery decisions may be misdirected
  • Attackers could use altered inventory data to support broader network compromise
  • Availability or integrity of connected device management may be reduced

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every state-changing message handler and reducing exposure of management protocols.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require strong authentication and authorization for MQTT operations that modify device state
  • Apply topic-level and operation-level access controls rather than trusting message reachability
  • Validate message origin, format, and permitted target values before performing updates
  • Restrict broker access to trusted management networks and use encrypted transport where supported
  • Run management components with the minimum privileges needed to update inventory data
  • Prefer secure-by-default configurations that do not expose administrative MQTT interfaces broadly

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for state-changing handlers lacking authorization gates
  • Review of MQTT topic permissions, broker ACLs, and unauthenticated message paths
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected updateSlaveIpList activity or unexplained inventory changes
  • Network policy checks that identify management brokers reachable from untrusted segments
  • Automated security testing that verifies unauthorized clients cannot invoke administrative operations

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
totolink.nettotolink.net/
totolink.nettotolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the device's MQTT message-handling surface is reachable by an attacker and accepts unauthenticated messages.

No authenticated account is required according to the vulnerability description, although network reachability to the relevant MQTT component is still necessary.

Require authenticated, authorized MQTT requests for inventory updates and enforce the authorization decision inside the update operation itself.

Apply deny-by-default broker ACLs, isolate management interfaces, validate all state-changing messages, and continuously monitor for unauthorized configuration or inventory changes.

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