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CVE-2026-51747

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Improper Access Control (CWE-284) in TOTOLINK T6 Router

CVE-2026-51747

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Mesh Communication and Information Disclosure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical access-control vulnerability in the keepAlive function of the TOTOLINK T6 can allow unauthenticated attackers to send crafted MQTT messages through the cs_broker component. Under deployments where the component is reachable, this may cause indirect mesh heartbeat information to be emitted toward the master device.

Affected context

The issue occurs in TOTOLINK T6 firmware 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 when the cs_broker component accepts MQTT input that can reach the keepAlive function. Risk depends on network exposure, broker access controls, and whether the device permits unauthenticated clients to submit messages that influence mesh operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The MQTT interface exposed by the cs_broker component. - Required access: No valid device credentials may be required if the broker

accepts unauthenticated client messages.

  • Trigger point: Processing of a crafted MQTT message that reaches the

keepAlive function.

  • Why exploitation is possible: The function does not sufficiently verify

authorization before allowing a message to cause indirect mesh heartbeat

information to be sent toward the master.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a message-driven control path. The keepAlive function accepts an operation originating from the MQTT component without adequately establishing that the sender is authorized to invoke it. This maps to CWE-284, Improper Access Control, because a protected mesh-related action is reachable without enforcement of the intended authorization boundary.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may cause unauthorized mesh heartbeat information to be emitted toward the master.
  • Mesh control-plane traffic could be manipulated or generated unexpectedly.
  • Network operators may experience misleading device activity or degraded mesh reliability.
  • Information about mesh status or device relationships could be exposed to an unauthorized party.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the MQTT broker and again at sensitive handler functions, rather than trusting message origin or topic selection alone. Secure-by-default deployments can disable unauthenticated MQTT access, restrict broker reachability to trusted network segments, validate message structure and intended recipients, and apply explicit authorization to mesh control operations. Separating service privileges and limiting access to mesh-management functions can reduce the consequences of a bypass. Configuration and policy controls should also prevent external clients from invoking internal heartbeat behavior.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis and code review for MQTT handlers that invoke mesh or device-management functions without visible authentication and authorization checks. Reviewers can trace message topics, client identity, and privilege decisions through the keepAlive call path. Runtime monitoring can alert on unauthenticated MQTT connections, unexpected heartbeat publications, unusual message rates, and mesh traffic originating from unauthorized clients. Network policy enforcement can restrict MQTT access to approved management paths, while automated security review tools may help identify missing authorization checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
github.comgithub.com/ShengWu00/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
totolink.nettotolink.net/
totolink.nettotolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the cs_broker MQTT interface is reachable by an attacker and accepts unauthenticated messages. Exposure depends on network configuration and broker restrictions.

Not necessarily. The reported behavior involves unauthenticated MQTT access, but effective access requirements depend on deployment-specific authentication and network controls.

Require authenticated and authorized MQTT clients, enforce authorization again inside the keepAlive handler, and limit broker exposure to trusted management networks.

Apply deny-by-default access policies, use explicit authorization for every device-management operation, validate message provenance and scope, and monitor MQTT activity for anomalous control-plane behavior.

Find out what's already
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