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CVE-2026-49222

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

Broken Object Level Authorization (CWE-639) in Vvveb Q&A

CVE-2026-49222

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Object Level Authorization

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized access and modification of product question data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Vvveb contains a broken object-level authorization flaw in backend product question operations, allowing a low-privileged Vendor to access questions associated with another Vendor's products. Depending on the operation, an attacker may read moderation data, change question status or content, or delete questions when the supplied question identifier is not checked against the caller's product ownership.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Vvveb backend product question functionality when:

  • A Vendor can invoke question management operations
  • The operation accepts a caller-controlled product question identifier
  • Authorization does not confirm that the question's product belongs to the authenticated Vendor
  • Database queries rely on the object identifier without enforcing ownership through the related product

Deployments using the affected product question workflows may expose pending question content, moderation state, and question-management actions across Vendor boundaries.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated Vvveb backend product question operations
  • Required access: A low-privileged Vendor account with access to question-management functionality
  • Trigger point: A request that references a product question object by identifier
  • Why exploitation is possible: The backend accepts the object identifier without consistently verifying the question's associated product against the current Vendor's authorized product scope

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. Backend queries use a caller-controlled product_question_id but do not reliably constrain the related product to the authenticated Vendor's ownership or administrative scope.

This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a class of broken access control in which possession of a valid object reference is incorrectly treated as sufficient authorization. The insecure pattern can affect read, update, status-change, and delete operations when authorization is not enforced at the data-access boundary.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read pending questions belonging to another Vendor
  • An attacker could access moderation data outside their authorized product scope
  • Product question content or moderation status may be altered
  • Questions could be deleted, affecting product Q&A visibility and integrity
  • Vendors may experience unauthorized disclosure or manipulation of customer interactions

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization for every object access and operation, rather than trusting identifiers supplied by clients.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the effective Vendor or administrative scope from the authenticated session
  • Applying ownership and tenant-boundary predicates directly in read, update, and delete queries
  • Treating object identifiers as references only, not as proof of authorization
  • Centralizing policy checks so all product question operations use the same authorization logic
  • Returning uniform not-found or access-denied behavior where appropriate to reduce object enumeration
  • Running backend services with only the database and application privileges they require
  • Using secure-by-default data-access abstractions that require an authorization scope before retrieving or mutating an object

These controls reduce cross-Vendor access even when identifiers are guessed, replayed, or obtained from another source.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this weakness through:

  • Static analysis for queries that use request-derived identifiers without adjacent ownership predicates
  • Code review checks for missing authorization on object-specific read, update, and delete handlers
  • Tests that exercise the same object operation with users from different Vendor or tenant scopes
  • Policy enforcement requiring authorization checks at service and repository boundaries
  • Runtime monitoring for repeated access attempts involving objects outside the caller's authorized scope
  • Automated security review tools that flag direct use of user-controlled identifiers in data-access paths

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/givanz/Vvveb/commit/1f2b117c1460818c9306a78f22c12f0b713886df
github.comgithub.com/givanz/Vvveb/releases/tag/1.0.8.4
github.comgithub.com/givanz/Vvveb/security/advisories/GHSA-cjhq-xqq3-6xv8

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable remotely through the Vvveb backend if the product question operations are exposed to an authenticated Vendor and the server fails to enforce product ownership.

The attacker generally needs a low-privileged Vendor account and access to the relevant question-management functionality. Administrative privileges should not be necessary when authorization checks are incomplete.

Enforce server-side authorization for every referenced question, including a check that its related product belongs to the authenticated Vendor's permitted scope before reading or changing it.

Use tenant-aware data-access policies, avoid treating object identifiers as authorization, and include cross-tenant authorization tests for every object-level API operation.

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