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CVE-2026-46407

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Insecure Direct Object Reference in Vvveb Admin API Token

CVE-2026-46407

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Direct Object Reference

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure and Unauthorized API Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An insecure direct object reference in Vvveb's backend admin/auth-token endpoint allows an authenticated administrator to retrieve other administrators' REST API token lists by specifying their admin_id.

This exposure can lead to disclosure of sensitive API tokens, enabling impersonation and unauthorized API access whenever multiple admins share the same backend.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in Vvveb deployments where:

  • Multiple administrators manage the same CMS instance
  • The backend admin/auth-token REST endpoint is enabled and reachable
  • Authentication is enforced, but per-object authorization is not correctly applied

In this context, any authenticated administrator can request token lists for other administrators by manipulating the admin_id parameter.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated backend admin REST API (admin/auth-token)
  • Required access: Valid administrator account with access to the admin interface or its underlying API
  • Trigger point: Issuing a request to the admin/auth-token endpoint with another administrator's admin_id
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint authorizes based solely on an authenticated session, without verifying that the requesting admin is allowed to access the specified admin_id's tokens

Why this happens

The core issue is a missing object-level authorization check on a parameterized resource.

The admin/auth-token endpoint relies on an admin_id parameter supplied by the client to select which administrator's API tokens to return but does not enforce that the caller is the owner of that admin_id or otherwise permitted to access it.

This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where user-controlled identifiers are trusted without enforcing object-level access control, leading to direct object reference exposure.

Potential impact

  • Disclosure of other administrators' REST API tokens
  • Impersonation of other administrators via stolen tokens
  • Unauthorized access to protected API endpoints using compromised tokens
  • Escalation of privileges within the CMS instance, depending on the permissions of the targeted administrator
  • Potential downstream compromise of integrated services that trust these API tokens

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on enforcing strict object-level authorization for all parameterized resources.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Binding token queries to the authenticated administrator's identity on the server side, ignoring client-supplied identifiers for self-service endpoints
  • Applying consistent access control checks before returning any resource linked to a user or administrator identifier
  • Designing APIs so that administrative actions on other accounts go through explicit, role-checked operations rather than freely accepting arbitrary identifiers
  • Minimizing exposure of full API tokens and preferring opaque references or partial disclosure where possible
  • Implementing least-privilege roles so that not all administrators can manage or view others' secrets by default

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can focus on both code and behavior:

  • Static analysis: Flag endpoints where user-controlled identifiers (such as admin_id, user_id) are directly used to query sensitive resources without an accompanying authorization check
  • Code review: Look for controllers or handlers returning tokens, secrets, or credentials and verify that they enforce ownership or role-based checks; pay special attention to admin and support tools
  • Logging and monitoring: Log requests to sensitive endpoints including caller identity and target identifier; alert on patterns where one admin repeatedly accesses tokens for other admins
  • Security testing: Include object-level authorization tests in automated API test suites, systematically attempting to access other users' resources by varying IDs

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/givanz/Vvveb/security/advisories/GHSA-5g3g-x6mf-pwr6

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only through the authenticated admin interface or its API. An attacker must first obtain valid administrator credentials or compromise an admin account to exploit the flaw remotely.

The attacker needs an authenticated administrator account with the ability to call the backend admin/auth-token endpoint. Standard non-admin users cannot typically reach this endpoint.

Enforce strict object-level authorization by validating that the requester is allowed to access the specified resource. For self-service endpoints, derive the target identity from the authenticated session rather than trusting client-supplied identifiers.

Adopt a consistent access control strategy that treats every user- or admin-scoped resource as requiring ownership or role checks, enforce these checks in a shared authorization layer, and include object-level authorization tests in code review and automated security testing workflows.

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