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CVE-2026-44730

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Improper Access Control in OpenCTI Organization User

CVE-2026-44730

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

OpenCTI contained an improper access control weakness that allowed an organization administrator to escalate their privileges by adding a higher-privileged user from another organization into their own organization.

Because the access control checks on the userEdit → relationAdd operation were incorrect, this cross-organization user association could result in unintended privilege elevation within the platform.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in OpenCTI deployments where:

  • Organizations and users are managed centrally within the same OpenCTI instance.
  • Organization administrators can edit user relationships (e.g., add users to organizations).
  • The access control logic does not strictly validate cross-organization relationship changes.

In this context, an organization admin can indirectly gain higher privileges by associating users from other organizations who hold broader or more powerful roles.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: OpenCTI web/API interface for user and organization administration.
  • Required access: Authenticated organization administrator account within any organization.
  • Trigger point: Performing a userEdit → relationAdd operation to link a user from a different organization, who has higher privileges, into the attacker's organization.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization checks on userEdit and related relationship operations do not sufficiently restrict which users can be linked to an organization, and do not enforce proper validation of cross-organization privilege boundaries.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an improper access control implementation in the user-organization relationship management logic.

Specifically, the userEdit → relationAdd operation does not correctly enforce constraints about which administrators may modify which user relationships across organizational boundaries.

This aligns with CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the system fails to ensure that only authorized principals can perform sensitive operations, allowing an administrator with limited scope to indirectly obtain higher privileges.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized elevation of an organization admin's effective privileges within OpenCTI.
  • Access to data, projects, or threat intelligence artifacts beyond the admin's intended organizational scope.
  • Ability to influence or manage users, roles, or configurations outside the original security boundary.
  • Degradation of tenant isolation and trust in role-based access controls.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation should focus on tightening authorization rules around relationship edits and enforcing strict organizational boundaries:

  • Introduce fine-grained access control checks for operations like userEdit and relationAdd, ensuring organization admins can only modify users within their own organization or explicitly allowed scopes.
  • Enforce server-side validation that cross-organization user associations require higher, centrally managed privileges (e.g., global admin) instead of organization-level admins.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to administrative roles, minimizing the breadth of operations they can perform on users and organizations.
  • Design access control rules declaratively, so that user-organization relationships inherit consistent, centrally defined authorization constraints.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both configuration/code-level and runtime signals:

  • Review authorization logic for administrative operations, looking for cases where organization-level roles can act on global or cross-organization resources.
  • Use static analysis or policy-as-code tools to flag endpoints or mutations that lack explicit checks for tenant boundaries and role scopes.
  • Instrument audit logging for user and organization changes, then monitor for patterns where organization admins associate users from other organizations or with unusually high privileges.
  • During security reviews, trace the call paths for user relationship edits to ensure all paths enforce role and organization checks consistently.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/OpenCTI-Platform/opencti/security/advisories/GHSA-q537-qhj4-wcjx

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be exploited remotely, but only by authenticated users with organization admin privileges who can access the OpenCTI interface or API.

The attacker must already be an organization administrator within OpenCTI. Anonymous users or regular members without admin rights cannot directly exploit this specific flaw.

The safest pattern is to centralize and harden authorization checks for administrative operations, ensuring that role and organizational scope are validated on every sensitive action. Relationship modifications (like adding users to organizations) should require explicit permission and be constrained to the admin's own tenant or a clearly defined scope.

Implement a consistent authorization framework that:

  • Encodes tenant boundaries and role scopes as first-class concepts.
  • Requires server-side checks for all admin mutations.
  • Uses defense-in-depth (e.g., policy-as-code, automated tests, and code reviews) to ensure new endpoints or mutations cannot bypass established access control policies.
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