Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Improper Access Control in D-Link DIR-816 goahead

CVE-2026-4180

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-266, CWE-284

Impact:

Authorization Bypass / Privilege Abuse

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

D-Link DIR-816 (firmware 1.10CNB05) contains an improper access control vulnerability in the goahead web interface, specifically in redirect.asp's handling of the token_id parameter.

By manipulating this token value over the network, a remote attacker may bypass intended authorization checks and gain access to functions or resources that should require stronger authentication or session validation.

Affected context

This weakness occurs in the embedded web management interface (goahead) of the D-Link DIR-816 router, within redirect.asp.

The vulnerability is present when:

  • The router is running firmware version 1.10CNB05 on affected DIR-816 hardware
  • The management interface is reachable over the network (e.g., LAN, or WAN if remote admin is enabled)
  • Application logic relies on the token_id parameter for access control decisions without robust verification

Only devices that remain on the unsupported, vulnerable firmware build are affected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the D-Link DIR-816 router (web management UI).
  • Required access: Network-level reachability to the router's admin interface; no valid credentials may be required if the token_id check is the primary gate.
  • Trigger point: An HTTP request to redirect.asp in the goahead component, with a crafted or manipulated token_id parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The code trusts the token_id parameter for authorization, applying incomplete or incorrect validation, which allows an attacker to reuse, forge, or manipulate token values to reach protected functionality.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization design flaw in how redirect.asp and the goahead component treat token_id as proof of access.

Instead of enforcing access based on a securely bound session, user identity, and role, the application implicitly trusts a client-controllable parameter to determine what a requester can do.

This maps to:

  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control – missing or weak enforcement of who is allowed to invoke a function or access a resource.
  • CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment – assigning or recognizing privileges based on untrusted or weakly verified tokens.

Conceptually, the bug class is "token-based authorization without strong binding," where access control decisions rely on data that can be guessed, replayed, or tampered with by the client.

Potential impact

  • Access to router configuration pages that should require authentication
  • Modification of network settings, Wi-Fi credentials, or firewall rules
  • Enabling or changing remote management settings, potentially exposing the device to broader attacks
  • Indirect compromise of devices on the internal network through weakened perimeter controls
  • Use of the router as a foothold for further network reconnaissance or attacks

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening authorization logic and reducing implicit trust in client-controlled tokens:

  • Replace token_id-based checks with robust session management tied to authenticated users, using server-side session stores that are not guessable or modifiable by clients.
  • Ensure that every sensitive action (configuration changes, administrative views) is gated by explicit authorization checks based on user identity and privilege, not solely on a parameter.
  • Bind tokens to specific sessions, IPs, and time windows, and invalidate them on logout, configuration changes, or inactivity.
  • Apply a least-privilege model so that even valid tokens only grant the minimal required access.
  • Limit network exposure of the admin interface: disable WAN-side access by default and restrict access to trusted management networks.
  • Where product lifecycle permits, favor platforms and firmware that receive ongoing security maintenance instead of relying on unsupported devices.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can be approached through code, configuration, and runtime analysis:

  • Static analysis: Look for authorization decisions that depend on query parameters or cookies like token_id without corresponding checks against a server-side session or ACL; flag direct trust in client-controlled tokens.
  • Code review: Examine goahead/redirect.asp (and similar handlers) to verify that:
  • Authentication is enforced before accessing privileged operations.
  • Tokens are validated against server-side session state, user identity, and privilege levels.
  • There are no "early exits" or alternate flows that bypass standard auth middleware.
  • Security testing: Use automated or manual web testing to:
  • Replay captured token_id values from different clients or times and observe whether access is still granted.
  • Attempt access to privileged URLs directly with missing, modified, or random token_id parameters.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt development policies that prohibit direct authorization decisions based on request parameters and require central, audited authorization middleware.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wudipjq/my_vuln/blob/main/D-Link7/vuln_84/84.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.351084
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.351084
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.769828
dlink.comdlink.com/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is exposed to the internet (e.g., remote administration enabled or port forwarding in place). If access is restricted to the local network, exploitation typically requires being on the same LAN or otherwise having network-level access.

Not necessarily. Because the flaw lies in how token_id is used for access control, a crafted or replayed token in some cases may be enough to reach restricted functionality without a standard login, depending on the specific deployment and configuration.

The safest pattern is to centralize authentication and authorization, ensuring all sensitive operations check server-side session state and role-based permissions. Tokens should be opaque, securely generated, bound to a session, and never used as the sole proof of privilege without server-side validation.

Implement a consistent authorization framework that:

  • Treats all client-supplied identifiers (including tokens) as untrusted.
  • Enforces access control based on server-side session and role information.
  • Uses defense-in-depth, such as CSRF protections, secure session cookies, and least-privilege roles.
  • Is accompanied by regular security reviews, threat modeling, and automated tests specifically targeting authorization boundaries.
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