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CVE-2026-41276

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass in Flowise AccountService

CVE-2026-41276

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Account Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Flowise suffers from an authentication bypass in its password reset workflow, where the resetPassword method does not verify that a valid reset token was issued for the target account.

An attacker who knows a user's email address can call the reset-password API with a null or empty token and take over that account by setting a new password.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Flowise deployments exposing the /api/v1/account/reset-password endpoint, where the AccountService maintains password reset tokens as nullable or empty-string fields.

It becomes relevant when:

  • Email addresses of valid users are guessable or can be enumerated
  • The resetPassword logic accepts requests without verifying that a reset token was legitimately generated
  • The application does not enforce additional verification factors in the password reset process

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Publicly accessible HTTP API endpoint /api/v1/account/reset-password
  • Required access: No prior authentication; only knowledge of a victim's email address is needed
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the resetPassword method in AccountService with a null or empty reset token
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation assumes that the presence of an email address is sufficient and does not confirm that:
  • A reset token was previously issued for that account, and
  • The provided token matches a stored, non-null, non-empty, unexpired token

Why this happens

The core issue is an incomplete authentication and authorization check around the password reset operation, mapping to CWE-287: Improper Authentication.

Instead of treating the reset token as a mandatory proof that the user initiated the reset and controls the associated email channel, the code path allows null or empty tokens to proceed.

This creates a logic flaw where password reset becomes tied solely to knowledge of the email identifier, effectively bypassing the intended secondary authentication factor (the token).

Conceptually, the workflow fails to:

  • Treat the reset token as a required credential
  • Validate that such a credential was generated and bound to the account
  • Reject resets when the credential is absent, invalid, or empty

Potential impact

  • Full account takeover for any user whose email address can be guessed or discovered
  • Unauthorized access to Flowise projects, flows, and configuration data
  • Manipulation of LLM workflows, including injection of malicious logic or exfiltration paths
  • Potential pivot into integrated systems, APIs, or data sources connected through Flowise
  • Loss of confidentiality and integrity for data processed within compromised flows

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on hardening the password reset workflow as an authenticated, token-driven process.

Common patterns include:

  • Treating reset tokens as mandatory, high-entropy, single-use credentials bound to a specific account and expiry time
  • Rejecting any password reset request where:
  • No token exists for the account
  • The provided token is null, empty, malformed, expired, or already consumed
  • Decoupling the reset action from user identifiers alone; email/username must never be sufficient to authorize password changes
  • Implementing rate limiting and monitoring for password reset attempts, especially for repeated requests against the same email
  • Adopting secure-by-default identity workflows (e.g., signed reset links delivered over an out-of-band channel like email)
  • Reducing privileges and visibility of administrative accounts to limit blast radius if compromise occurs

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level and runtime signals:

Static and code review signals

  • Password reset methods that:
  • Do not check for existence and validity of a reset token
  • Accept null, empty, or default values for security-critical parameters
  • Authorize sensitive state changes (like password updates) based solely on user identifiers
  • Absence of checks for token expiry, revocation, and one-time use
  • Lack of audit logging around password reset operations

Runtime and monitoring signals

  • Logs showing frequent reset requests for many different accounts originating from the same IP or client
  • Password resets executed without corresponding "reset token issued" events
  • Unusual spikes in successful password resets, especially for privileged or rarely used accounts

Security teams can use application security testing tools, linters, and custom rules in CI/CD pipelines to flag insecure authentication flows and missing token validation logic.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-f6hc-c5jr-878p

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The password reset endpoint is typically exposed over HTTP, and exploitation can be performed remotely by anyone who can reach the Flowise instance and knows or guesses a victim's email address.

No. The flaw exists precisely because the password reset logic does not require prior authentication or a valid reset token, so an unauthenticated attacker can initiate the attack.

The safest pattern is to enforce strict, token-based verification for any password reset:

  • Generate a unique, hard-to-guess token when a reset is requested
  • Send that token out-of-band (e.g., via email) to the account owner
  • Require the exact token to be presented and validated (including expiry and one-time use) before allowing a password change
  • Reject resets when no token exists or when the token is null, empty, or invalid

Organizations can:

  • Standardize on vetted authentication and account recovery flows (e.g., using established identity frameworks)
  • Perform security reviews specifically targeting password reset and recovery paths
  • Add automated checks for logic that authorizes sensitive operations based solely on user identifiers
  • Incorporate threat modeling for identity-related features to ensure all flows require a valid secret or token, not just knowledge of an email or username.
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