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CVE-2026-38751

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Unrestricted File Upload in OpenSTAManager Module Update

CVE-2026-38751

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-434

Impact:

Potential Remote Code Execution and Server Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenSTAManager 2.10 and earlier allows arbitrary file uploads through the module update functionality without sufficient validation of file type and content.

An attacker who can access the module upload endpoint may be able to upload malicious files to the server, potentially leading to remote code execution or unauthorized access depending on server configuration.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in OpenSTAManager's module update feature, specifically in modules/aggiornamenti/upload_modules.php, where administrators can upload packages to update or extend functionality.

The risk is present when the application accepts module archives or files from users and stores them in web-accessible or executable locations without enforcing strict checks on file type, extension, or upload destination.

Environments where web server execution is enabled for uploaded content, or where uploaded files are later processed dynamically, are particularly exposed.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface for module update uploads (upload_modules.php).
  • Required access: Ability to submit module upload requests (typically authenticated with module management permissions; actual requirement depends on deployment access controls).
  • Trigger point: Uploading a crafted file or archive through the module update form or API endpoint, which is then stored without adequate validation.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The upload mechanism does not sufficiently restrict file types, validate content, or segregate uploads into non-executable storage, allowing potentially executable or script files to be placed in locations where the server can interpret them.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type.

The module update handler accepts user-supplied files and saves them on the server without enforcing robust validation of MIME type, file extension, or internal content, and without constraining where the files are stored.

Insecure patterns typically include:

  • Trusting client-provided file names or MIME types.
  • Allowing upload of archives that may contain executable or script files.
  • Placing uploaded files under web-accessible, executable paths where the web server or interpreter can run them.

This combination enables an attacker to introduce files that the server may later execute, interpret, or process in unsafe ways.

Potential impact

  • Execution of uploaded scripts or binaries on the server (remote code execution), depending on server configuration.
  • Unauthorized modification or replacement of application modules.
  • Deployment of web shells or backdoors for persistent access.
  • Exposure or tampering with sensitive data handled by OpenSTAManager.
  • Use of the compromised server as a pivot point for broader network attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening file handling for the module update path and reducing the trust placed in uploaded content:

  • Restrict allowed file types to a minimal set required for module updates, validating both extension and MIME type on the server side.
  • Inspect module packages at upload time (e.g., inspect archive contents) and reject any that contain executable, script, or otherwise dangerous file types.
  • Store uploaded files outside of web-accessible and executable directories, and process them in controlled locations with limited privileges.
  • Apply strict naming and path normalization to prevent path traversal or placement of files in unintended directories.
  • Run the application and web server under least-privilege accounts, reducing the impact if a malicious file is stored.
  • Introduce a review or signing model for modules, where only trusted, validated modules are accepted for installation.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves both code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Identify upload handlers that move files to server directories without:
  • Enforcing strict allowlists for extensions and MIME types.
  • Validating archive contents or sanitizing file names.
  • Segregating uploads into non-executable storage.
  • Look for direct use of client-supplied file names or paths when saving uploads.
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Review web server configuration to ensure upload directories are not configured to execute scripts.
  • Enforce security policies that require validation of all module or plugin uploads.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor upload directories for newly created executable or script files.
  • Use file integrity monitoring to detect unexpected changes in module directories.
  • Analyze application logs for anomalous module upload or update activity.
  • Automated security testing tools (e.g., SAST/DAST or CI-integrated checks) can be configured to flag unrestricted upload patterns and risky storage locations.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/devcode-it/openstamanager
github.comgithub.com/fuutianyii/poc

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in typical deployments the module upload endpoint is reachable over HTTP(S). However, exploitation generally requires the ability to reach and use the module update functionality, which may be restricted to authenticated administrative users.

An attacker must be able to submit files to the module update handler. In many setups this is limited to authenticated users with module or system administration rights, but misconfigurations or shared credentials can broaden exposure.

Implement a strict allowlist of permitted module package types, validate archive contents before accepting an upload, and store all uploaded content in non-executable locations while ensuring the web server cannot directly execute or interpret uploaded files.

Adopt a hardened file upload architecture: treat all uploaded files as untrusted, validate both metadata and content against explicit policies, isolate uploads from executable paths, enforce least-privilege for services handling uploads, and include upload logic in regular security reviews and automated scanning.

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