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CVE-2026-37526

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Improper Access Control in AGL afb-daemon

CVE-2026-37526

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Local Privilege Abuse and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

AGL app-framework-binder (afb-daemon) exposes a supervision Unix abstract socket that accepts powerful management commands from any local process without authentication or permission checks.

This allows low-privileged local code to kill the daemon, invoke arbitrary API calls, close sessions, and read global configuration, leading to local privilege abuse and denial of service in affected systems.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in AGL app-framework-binder (afb-daemon) deployments that enable the supervision mechanism using the abstract Unix socket @urn:AGL:afs:supervision:socket.

In these setups, the supervision interface is reachable by any local process on the same host or container namespace, because the abstract socket is not protected by traditional filesystem DAC controls.

When such systems run afb-daemon with elevated privileges or as a central gateway for application APIs, untrusted local applications can gain disproportionate control over daemon behavior.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Local inter-process communication via an abstract Unix domain socket
  • Required access: Ability to execute code or run a process on the same system/namespace where the afb-daemon supervision socket is bound
  • Trigger point: Sending specially crafted supervision commands (Exit, Do, Sclose, Config, Trace, Debug, Token, slist) to @urn:AGL:afs:supervision:socket
  • Why exploitation is possible: The on_supervision_call handler dispatches all supervision commands without any credential or authorization verification, and the abstract socket has no DAC enforcement, effectively making the interface world-accessible to local processes

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a missing authorization boundary on a privileged control interface, mapping to CWE-284: Improper Access Control.

The supervision socket was designed as a management channel but was implemented as an unauthenticated, globally accessible abstract Unix socket.

The on_supervision_call function in src/afb-supervision.c blindly executes powerful commands (such as Exit, Do, Sclose, Config) for any caller, and the header comment acknowledges the absence of DAC protections on the socket.

This design treats all local processes as trusted by default, rather than enforcing any identity, capability, or policy check before executing sensitive supervision operations.

Potential impact

  • Local processes may terminate the afb-daemon using the Exit supervision command, causing denial of service for all dependent applications.
  • Untrusted local applications can invoke arbitrary afb-daemon API calls via the Do command, potentially escalating their effective privileges within the application framework.
  • Attackers can close arbitrary user or client sessions with the Sclose command, disrupting legitimate users or services.
  • The entire global configuration can be leaked via the Config command, exposing sensitive operational details or secrets stored in configuration.
  • Debugging and tracing controls (Trace, Debug, Token, slist) can be abused to gather additional internal information or manipulate runtime behavior.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically centers on hardening the supervision interface and treating it as a privileged boundary rather than a generic local IPC channel.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Introducing explicit authentication and authorization checks for all supervision commands, tying actions to an authenticated identity or capability.
  • Restricting access to the supervision socket using OS-level mechanisms such as Unix credentials, namespaces, or dedicated service accounts, avoiding globally reachable abstract endpoints.
  • Splitting high-risk commands (e.g., Exit, Do, Config) into a separate interface or control plane guarded by stricter policies.
  • Applying the principle of least privilege so that afb-daemon runs with only the minimal permissions needed, reducing the blast radius if supervision is misused.
  • Providing configuration options to disable or limit the supervision interface entirely in production or untrusted environments, keeping powerful management channels off by default where possible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis and code review can flag management or supervision interfaces that:
  • Bind to abstract or globally accessible Unix sockets without permission checks.
  • Dispatch powerful commands without verifying caller credentials or roles.
  • Security reviews should treat any "control" or "supervision" modules as high-risk, examining whether authentication, authorization, and audit logging are consistently applied.
  • Runtime monitoring can track unusual use of supervision commands, such as unexpected Exit or Config calls, and raise alerts when invoked by non-administrative processes.
  • Policy-based checks in CI/CD (e.g., linters, security scanners) can enforce rules around IPC endpoint exposure and privileged command handlers to prevent similar issues from being introduced.

Sources

SourceLink
gerrit.automotivelinux.orggerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/src/app-framework-binder
gist.github.comgist.github.com/sgInnora/8526eedcfd826d05ef1fc45d8f405643

Frequently asked

questions

It is primarily a local vulnerability. Exploitation requires the attacker to run code on the same system or within the same IPC namespace as the afb-daemon supervision socket, although local code execution might be obtained through other vectors.

The attacker needs only low-privileged local access—such as a regular user process or untrusted application—because the abstract Unix socket is not protected by standard filesystem DAC controls and does not enforce authentication.

The safest pattern is to treat supervision as a privileged control plane: enforce strong authentication and authorization for all commands, narrow the socket's exposure to trusted principals only, and consider disabling or separating high-impact operations like Exit, Do, and Config into tightly controlled channels.

Future designs should adopt a "zero trust" stance toward local IPC, requiring explicit identity verification and permission checks for any privileged operation, subjecting management interfaces to dedicated security review, and using automated checks to detect unauthenticated control sockets or handlers in the codebase.

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