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CVE-2026-36727

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in Bookcars JWT Handling

CVE-2026-36727

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Account Takeover and Unauthorized Access

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The /api/social-sign-in endpoint in Bookcars v8.3 contains an insecure authentication flaw that allows attackers to bypass normal login checks using a forged JWT token.

When this weakness is present, an attacker who can craft or manipulate JSON Web Tokens may gain unauthorized access to user accounts and protected application features.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in deployments of Bookcars v8.3 that expose the /api/social-sign-in endpoint and rely on JWTs for authenticating social login requests.

It manifests when the backend accepts tokens that are not robustly validated—for example, failing to verify signatures, algorithms, issuer, or audience constraints.

The issue becomes particularly risky in Internet-exposed environments or where social login tokens are accepted from external identity providers without strict trust boundaries.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The public-facing /api/social-sign-in HTTP endpoint.
  • Required access: Network access to the Bookcars API; no valid user account is strictly required if token verification is weak.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted or forged JWT token in a social sign-in request.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authentication layer does not adequately verify the authenticity and integrity of the JWT (e.g., accepting unsigned tokens, not checking signatures or claims), allowing attackers to impersonate users or create arbitrary identities.

Why this happens

The root cause is insufficient enforcement of authentication semantics when processing JWT-based social login requests.

Instead of strictly validating token signatures, algorithms, and critical claims, the /api/social-sign-in endpoint implicitly trusts token contents or performs incomplete checks.

This aligns with CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where the application fails to prove that the entity presenting credentials is genuinely authorized, often due to misused or partially implemented authentication mechanisms.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could log in as arbitrary users by forging JWTs that reference target accounts.
  • Malicious actors may create or assume high-privilege accounts if role or scope claims are trusted without verification.
  • Unauthorized access to personal data, bookings, and other sensitive information within the Bookcars platform.
  • Potential abuse of application functionality, including fraud, data manipulation, or disruption of normal service operations.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically centers on enforcing strict, standards-compliant JWT validation and hardening the authentication boundary.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Verifying JWT signatures using trusted keys and rejecting tokens that fail signature checks or use unexpected algorithms.
  • Enforcing claim validation (issuer, audience, subject, expiration, not-before) and rejecting tokens outside configured constraints.
  • Isolating and hardening integration with social identity providers, treating all external tokens as untrusted until fully validated.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to derived user sessions, avoiding automatic elevation based solely on token-embedded roles.
  • Centralizing authentication logic in well-reviewed components rather than re-implementing JWT checks at each endpoint.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis rules or manual code review that flag direct parsing of JWTs without robust signature and claim verification.
  • Inspection of authentication middleware to ensure all entry points (including social sign-in) funnel through consistent, hardened validation routines.
  • Security tests and fuzzing of the /api/social-sign-in endpoint using intentionally malformed or unsigned JWTs to confirm they are rejected.
  • Logging and monitoring for anomalous login patterns, such as spikes in new sessions from unrecognized tokens or unexpected identity providers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/CC-T-454455/Vulnerabilities/tree/master/bookcars/vulnerability-1

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Because the /api/social-sign-in endpoint is typically exposed over HTTP(S), any remote attacker with network access to the API can attempt to exploit weak JWT validation.

The attacker generally only needs the ability to send HTTP requests to the affected endpoint. A valid user account is not strictly required if the implementation accepts forged tokens without robust verification.

Centralize JWT handling in a dedicated authentication component that strictly verifies signatures, algorithms, and all critical claims against trusted configuration, and ensure all sign-in flows—including social login—are forced through this hardened path.

Use well-maintained authentication libraries, enforce security reviews for all changes touching authentication and token handling, add automated tests that exercise invalid and forged token scenarios, and apply defense-in-depth controls such as rate limiting and anomaly detection around login endpoints.

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